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Case Comments
Antitrust Law: Securities Exchange Act
Does Not Exempt Exchange From the Sherman Act
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) ordered its member
firms to sever wire connections with petitioners,' nonmember
dealers in over-the-counter securities. Petitioners were neither
notified of the order, nor given a hearing. When repeated attempts
to elicit an explanation from the Exchange failed, they instituted
a treble damage suit alleging that the action of the Exchange
and its members constituted a concerted refusal to deal, in viola-
tion of the Sherman ActY The trial court granted petitioners'
motion for summary judgment The Second Circuit reversed,4
finding that the antitrust laws were inapplicable because
the action of the Exchange was authorized by the Securities
Exchange Act of 193V. On certiorari, the Supreme Court af-
1. The Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange is empow-
ered to require the discontinuance of connections between member firms
and nonmembers. CCH, NYSE CONSTITUTION & Ru ms 1056 (Coast., art.
III, § 6) (March, 1959). The rules also provide that "the Exchange may
require at any time that any means of communication be discontinued." Id.
2355 (Rule 355).
2. See note 17, infra. The Exchange was charged with a violation of
§§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.C.
§§ 1, 2 (1958). Petitioners sought treble damages and injunctive relief under
§§ 4 & 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26
(1958).
Two additional causes of action were alleged; first that the Exchange
had tortiously induced its member firms to breach their wire connection
contracts with petitioners, see generally Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952);
the second asserted that the Exchange's action constituted a tort of inten-
tional and wrongful harm inflicted without reasonable cause, see, e.g.,
American Oil Co. v. Towler, 56 Ga. App. 866, 194 S.E. 223 (1937).
3. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
60 McH. L. 11Ev. 213, 71 YAL LJ. 748 (1962). The motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, FmD. R. Crv. P. 56(a), (c), was granted with respect to the
private wire connections. A separate claim based on the removal of the NYSE
stock ticker service was found to present questions of fact that required
trial. 196 F. Supp. at 229.
4. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962), 111
U. PA. L. Ray. 2 6. The court remanded the case for consideration of peti-
tioners' second and third causes of action.
5. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U..C. §§ 78a-hh (1958).
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firmed the judgment of the trial court and held that the antitrust
laws apply to a registered exchange and that the NYSE, by
denying petitioners procedural safeguards, failed to justify their
boycott under the Securities Exchange Act. Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
The Exchange Act is designed to promote fair dealing and
to protect investors;' the act authorizes registered stock exchanges'
to regulate their members8 through rules embodying these goals.
The act leaves the day to day regulation of exchange members
to the exchanges themselves, subject to limited supervision by
the Securities Exchange Commission." The conduct of members
is governed by exchange rules10 providing sanctions that are
adequate to deal with violations of fair conduct standards."
Although the exchanges do not directly regulate the activities of
nonmembers, by prohibiting members from engaging in certain
types of transactions, nonmembers who formerly conducted these
transactions are affected. In some instances this indirect regula-
tion may violate the antitrust laws.
6. These objectives are stated throughout the Exchange Act. E.g., 48
Stat. 881-82 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1958) ("to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets"); 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(2) (1958)
("for the protection of investors").
7. Unless an exchange is registered with the Securities Exchange Com-
mission it must forego the privilege of using any instrumentality of interstate
commerce. 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1958).
8. See Gary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244
(1963).
9. See Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214, 222 (1959); Westwood &
Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CONTEMI'.
PRoB. 518, 524--25 (1952).
Various factors influenced the congressional decision to permit exchanges
to continue to regulate their members: the tradition of exchange self-
regulation, see Westwood & Howard, supra at 518-22 (1952); the opposition
of the financial community to governmental control of the daily business of
exchange members, see 2 Scn.EsiNoEn, THE AGE OF RoosvEvT, TE COMING
OF THE NEw DrAL 463 (1959); and the magnitude of the task of exercising
such control for a government agency, see Hearings on Stock Exchange
Practices Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6582 (1934).
10. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(a)(3) requires deposit with
the SEC of "copies of its [any exchange's] constitution, articles of incorpora-
tion with all amendments thereto, and of its existing bylaws or rules or
instruments corresponding thereto, whatever the name, which are herein-
after collectively referred to as the 'rules of the exchange.'" 48 Stat. 886
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (1958).
11. 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1958).
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which serves the antitrust policy
of preserving a competitive economy - by outlawing contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade,'3 proscribes
group boycotts.' 4 A group boycott is a concerted refusal to deal
that has an adverse economic effect on third parties.'3 Unlike
some alleged trade restraints,"' such boycotts are illegal even
when they result in reasonable restraints of trade; the group
boycott is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'7
The per se rule is justified by the restrictive economic effect of
a boycott and because anticompetitive results may be achieved
by a boycotting group that acts with apparently valid motives.
The danger of such results outweighs any desirable effect that
12. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
13. Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1958).
14. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 804
U.S. 656 (1961); MKor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959); Associated Press v. United States, 826 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Orig-
inators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
15. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
16. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (inaugurating
the "rule of reason").
17. On the authority of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959); Associated Press v. United States, 826 U . 1 (1945), and
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), the
Court determined that absent the Exchange Act, the action of the NYSE in
the instant case constituted a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Instant case at 347-49. The reaffirmance of the Kor's per se doctrine by
the Radiant Burners case made it quite clear that the Court considers a
group boycott illegal per se. See Note, Antitrust: Trade Association's Refusal
To Deal Held a Per.Se Violation, 1961 Dunn LJ. 302; cf., Note, Use of Eco-
nomic Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality Under the Slwrmvn Act, 30
U. CH. L. R v. 171 (1962); Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 977 (1957). But see
PAcKER, THn STATE OF XESEARcH I ANTITRUST LAW 80-83 (1903). See also
35 U. Coo. L. Rzv. 577-92 (1963). Most legal commentators condemn the
per se approach to boycott problems. See Barber, Refusals To Deal Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 876-79 (1955); Oppen-
heim, Selected Antitrust Developments in the Courts and FTC During Past
Year, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SrTxoN 37 (1959); Rahl, Per So Rules and
Boycotts Under the Sherman Act:. Some Reflections on the Kor's Case, 45
VA. L. Rav. 1165, 1172 (1959). In some lower court decisions the per se
rule has not been applied. See Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652
(2d Cir. 1957); Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign MIarine
Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1952); United States v. Insurance Bd., 188
F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960); United States v. United States Trotting
Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 69761 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
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can be expected from permitting the private use of this power.
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,' 8 for
example, the refusal of gas companies to sell gas to be used in
burners not certified by a testing organization could have the
legitimate effect of promoting the sale of gas by insuring that
defective burners are not placed on the market; it could also
have the anticompetitive effect of creating a monopoly position
for approved burner manufacturers by making it impossible for
uncertified manufacturers to stay in business. The Court has
not recognized a utility in permitting this type of boycott that
outweighs the harm proscribed by Congress. 9
A conflict between the Exchange Act and the Sherman Act
arose in the instant case. Although the NYSE's private wire
rules20 were found to be within the Exchange's regulatory author-
ity under the Exchange Act,21 their enforcement was held to
constitute an illegal boycott under the Sherman Act. The private
wire rules permitted the NYSE to require its members to dis-
continue wire connections with nonmembers. These wires are
necessary to securities dealers because securities prices fluctuate
over short periods of time; rapid communication is essential to
guarantee execution of a transaction at or close to the last
reported price. Since a large portion of exchange members' busi-
ness is conducted by means of these private wires,22 exchange
regulation of its members, in order to completely encompass
members' business conduct, requires some control over mem-
bers' use of the wires. On the other hand, the concerted action
of the Exchange and its members in the instant case in denying
petitioners a business service essential to their ability to com-
pete effectively in the over-the-counter market clearly violated
the Sherman Act per se rule against boycotts 3
The Exchange Act contains no express exemption from the
antitrust laws for a registered exchange, and the Court properly
rejected the NYSE's contention that an exemption is implied
wherever an exchange enforces rules adopted under the authority
18. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
19. Id. at 659-60.
20. See note 1 supra.
21. On this point the Court agreed with the court of appeals, 302 F.2d
at 716, and disagreed with the trial court, 196 F. Supp. at 221-22.
22. NYSE member firms not only execute orders for nonmember firms
in listed stocks, they are also a major factor in the over-the-counter market.
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Special Study of Scouri-
ties Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1903);
instant case at 358-54.
23. See note 17 supra.
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of the act. The Court has been reluctant to grant an exemption
from the antitrust laws to regulated industries; 4 an irreconcilable
conflict between the regulatory statute and the antitrust laws
is required. 5 Even then, the exemption is limited to the extent
of the conflict? 6 In addition, the securities industry is unlike
most regulated industries in that the Exchange itself is statu-
torily charged with regulative duties, whereas regulation is
usually an exclusive responsibility of a government agency. Al-
though the threat of antitrust liability for regulatory acts might
discourage the Exchange from exercising its regulatory powers,
enforcement of the antitrust laws outweighs this possible adverse
effect on Exchange regulation. The antitrust laws are the only
check on Exchange abuse of its authority; the SEC, which is
the agency representing the public interest in this area, has no
power to review Exchange disciplinary actions.7 Moreover,
since there is no provision in the Exchange Act for administrative
review of the disciplinary acts of an exchange, petitioners had
only a judicial remedy; if the Court had refused to entertain
the antitrust claim by finding an implied exemption, petitioners'
opportunity for review and redress would have been foreclosed.28
In accommodating the underlying purposes of the Exchange
Act and the Sherman Act, the Court in the instant case began
24. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
25. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, S71 U.S. 296,
304-05 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); Georgia v.
Pennsylvania RR., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945). A subsequent decision of
the Court upholds this view. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'I Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 350-52 (1963); cf. Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust
Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 673,
701 (1958).
26. Ibid.
27. Instant case at 357; see 2 Loss, SEGuEirms REGULATIO, 1178 (2d ed.
1961). The Court indicates that if SEC review of exchange disciplinary
action were available a different result might obtain. See instant case at 358
n.12, 360. SEC review would not prevent the Court from considering the
case at all, but the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would at least require
review by the Commission in the first instance. See Latta, Primary Jurisdic-
tion, in the Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws, 30 U. Cwc. L. R1EV.
261 (1961); Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive
and Procedural Coordination, 58 CoLm. L. PREv. 673, 691-94 (1958). There
is some indication in Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412
(1951), that commission review makes antitrust exemption more likely. But
see California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
28. Although petitioners alleged two causes of action in addition to the
antitrust claim, see note 2 supra, and the court of appeals remanded the
case for consideration of these claims, see note 4 supra, it seems apparent
that the defense of justification under the Exchange Act would apply to
1964]
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with the premise that the Exchange Act is a defense to an anti-
trust suit only to the extent that exchange action fully reflects
the aims of that act.29 The Court reasoned that an exchange
must provide procedural safeguards for disciplinary action
against nonmembers because a congressional intent to require
such safeguards is implicit in the Exchange Act. Moreover, a
hearing and attendant procedural safeguards eliminate the
danger of substantive inaccuracy inherent in ex parte proceed-
ings. Since the NYSE had failed to provide these safeguards, it
could not justify its action under the Exchange Act.
In so holding, however, the Court neither provided a guide
to measure the antitrust liability of an exchange for future
regulatory actions, nor clearly decided the basic question of
whether an exchange's power to regulate extends to nonmembers.
If an exchange does not have this power under the Exchange
Act, it will be unable to avoid antitrust liability by providing
the procedural safeguards for nonmembers required by the Court.
If it does have this power, however, the Court's opinion does
not define the extent of antitrust immunity an exchange can
achieve by providing procedural safeguards in the regulation
of nonmembers.
In analyzing the Exchange Act to determine those aspects
of exchange self-regulation that might require antitrust immu-
nity, exchange regulation of members should be distinguished
from regulation of nonmembers. Exchange regulation of members
may require the use or threatened use of a boycott to effectively
enforce rules within the aims of the Exchange Act. Unless nec-
essary to accomplish the regulatory purposes of the Exchange
Act, the use of boycotts, even against members, should consti-
tute an antitrust violation. The threat of suspension or expulsion
is an important sanction enabling an exchange to control the
conduct of its members. Although a variety of lesser sanctions
may be available to an exchange for rule enforcement purposes,
such as fines and loss of privileges, if a member refuses to obey
these lesser sanctions or they fail to deter his conduct, the
exchange is forced to resort to suspension or expulsion. Suspen-
sion or expulsion would come within the antitrust rule against
boycotts, but if the self-regulation embodied in the Exchange
these claims as much as to the antitrust claim. Of course the hardship that
would be imposed on petitioners by denying them a remedy is not sufficient
reason by itself to refuse to find an implicit exemption. The severe sanctions
of treble damages and criminal liability under the antitrust laws make it
important to avoid using these laws solely as a means of providing redress
for quasi-administrative caprice.
29. Instant case at 361.
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Act is to be effective, antitrust immunity must be granted in
such a case. This immunity need be no broader than to permit a
boycott as a means of enforcing a rule consistent with the ob-
jectives of the Exchange Act. Thus, if an antitrust suit against
an exchange were predicated on an antitrust violation not con-
nected with a boycott to insure rule compliance, there would
be no antitrust immunity. As an example, the minimum com-
mission schedules of the NYSE might be characterized as price-
fixing," for which no antitrust immunity is necessary under the
Exchange Act. Likewise, if a rule enforcement boycott were
imposed against a member for violating an exchange rule against
hiring a Negro, no antitrust immunity need be granted since
the rule sought to be enforced by a boycott would not be within
the aims of the Exchange Act."' It is the boycott inherent in
rule enforcement that requires some antitrust exemption to
preserve the aims of the Exchange Act.
With regard to nonmembers, however, there is less justifi-
cation for exchange action. Since most nonmember, over-the-
counter dealers are members of the National Association of
Security Dealers (NASD),32 an association authorized under
the Maloney Act3 3 to regulate over-the-counter dealers,34 there
30. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 39 US.
485 (1950).
31. It is open to question whether the antitrust laws should be used to
achieve noneconomic goals. See note 17 supra. Perhaps the Sherman Act rule
against boycotts should be applied to all group conduct having favorable
economic consequences for the group, since for whatever reason a boycott
of this type is imposed, it serves to eliminate a competitor. Of. Note, 105
U. PA. L. Rv. 977, 995 (1957).
32. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5701, and H.R. 9319, 84th Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. 682 (1956) (The Executive Director of the NASD testified that
its membership "covered practically every one that was in the securities
business, as we know it."); see 2 Loss, Swum'nms REGuLATiON, 1365-66 n.20
(2d ed. 1961). Of the 4964 broker-dealers in the country, 4417 were members
of the NASD as of February 28, 1962. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, Table 1-7, at 30 (1963).
33. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958). The
Maloney Act was designed to remedy the inadequacy of the Exchange Act as
a device for controlling the conduct of over-the-counter dealers who were
not members of an exchange. See Westwood & Howard, supra note 9, at
526-27; cf. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
34. See generally 2 Loss, SEcUrTms REGuLATION 1359-92 (2d ed. 1901);
Frey, Federal Regulation of the Ovdr-the-Counter Securities farket, 106
U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 43-45 (1957); Note, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1580, 1587-89 (1900);
Note, Over-the-Counter Trading and the Maloney Act, 48 YA.E LJ. 633
(1939).
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exists an alternative to exchange action. This alternative- the
regulation of over-the-counter dealers through the NASD- in-
volves no antitrust problem, for antitrust immunity is provided
by the Maloney Act. 5 Given the availability of an alternative,
the only justification for permitting an exchange to regulate
nonmembers would be that the exchange is better able to do
so than the NASD. This is not the case, however, because the
NASD has closer contact with its members than does an ex-
change. Unlike the disciplinary actions of an exchange, NASD
disciplinary actions are subject to review by the SEC."' This
closer supervision makes it more likely that disciplinary activi-
ties will be conducted in a fair manner2 7 The Sherman Act rule
against boycotts is particularly directed at avoiding private con-
certed action having a detrimental economic effect on outsiders.
Since the supervision of an objective government agency is
lacking in the case of exchange regulation of nonmembers, there
is danger that an exchange, composed of businessmen whose in-
terests are involved, would regulate competitors improperly if
the antitrust laws did not apply when it attempted to regulate
nonmembers.
Civil Rights: Incorporation of All-White
City Does Not Violate Negroes' Rights
In proceedings to incorporate noncontiguous areas of Dear-
born Township, Michigan, a "strip," three blocks wide, was
detached from adjacent Inkster Village.' Plaintiffs, Negro resi-
dents of that village, sought to enjoin the detachment, contend-
ing that the boundaries of the strip were drawn along racial lines
to exclude Negroes from the new city. On appeal from a ruling
adverse to plaintiffs, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed' and
35. 52 Stat. 1073-74, 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(i), (n) (1958); see 2
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1369-70 (2d ed. 1961).
86. 52 Stat. 1073 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g) (1958). The SEC is not
given authority to review disciplinary actions taken by a registered exchange.
Instant case at 357; 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1178 (2d ed. 1961).
37. The Maloney Act also prescribes a procedural system that must be
observed in NASD disciplinary actions. 52 Stat. 1071-72 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §
78o-3(b)(9) (1958).
1. See Village of Inkster v. Wayne County Supervisors, 363 Mich. 165, 107,
108 N.W.2d 822, 823 (1961) (map of area to be incorporated).
2. The case was remanded for the purpose of exercising continuing juris-
diction to entertain any future suits against the new city should its subse-
quent conduct prove discriminatory. Taylor v. Township of Dearborn, 120
N.W.2d 737, 744 (Mich. 1963).
604 [Vol. 48
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held that plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had been dis-
criminated against by the detachment. Taylor v. Township of
Dearborn, 120 N.W.2d 737 (Mich. 1963) .
The courts have traditionally acknowledged that the states
have plenary power to create, alter, and destroy boundaries of
municipal subdivisions; and the courts have generally been re-
luctant to impose restrictions in this area.4 Where it has been
alleged that that power has been used to discriminate against
minorities, however, the courts have been more willing to review.
In the landmark case of Gomillionr v. Lightfoot, for example,
state control over municipal boundaries was juxtaposed with
claims of Negro disenfranchisement. Dispelling broad language
of earlier cases which suggested that state power in this area
was not limited by the federal constitution 0 the United States
Supreme Court held that state-created boundaries are not im-
mune from constitutional attack where- their creation results in
a denial of voting privileges to Negroes.
In Gomillion the plaintiffs, residents of Tuskegee, Alabama,
3. This case arose out of Village of Inkster v. Wayne County Supervisors,
363 Mich. 165, 108 N.W.2d 822 (1961), in which the village contested the
validity of proceedings to incorporate Dearborn Township. The village as-
serted that all residents had to express approval of the detachment rather
than only those who lived in the strip area. The Michigan Supreme Court
held that portions of the village could be included in the new city without
the express consent of the entire village. During the course of oral argument
the racial-constitutional issue was raised by a member of the court. Subse-
quently, the.attorney general intervened and moved to remand in order to
take testimony to determine whether or not the incorporation represented an
attempt to segregate Negroes or to exclude Negroes from the city. Five
members of the court suggested that an original class suit instituted after
the court had determined the statutory propriety of the proceedings was
the proper procedure to follow. Four justices would have remanded.
4. Where the subordinate governmental unit has protested action by the
state, the courts have generally upheld the state's power. See, e.g., City of
Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); City of Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182 (1923); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903). In the leading
case of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), the Supreme Court
stated that individual residents of a municipality have no constitutional
basis for a complaint against the state for alteration of boundaries even
where they suffer inconvenience or their property declines in value.
5. 364 U.S. 389 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.), 35 NorTn DA2%m LAw. 143, U.
PA. L. Ruv. 1173 (1961); see Comment, Federal Constitutional Limitations
on State Power Over Political Subdivisions, 61 CoLmiM. L. RIv. 704 (1961).
See generally TAPER, GoiM oN v. LiGm ooT (1962); Lucas, Dragon in the
Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in 1961 Sumaitm CouaT
Rtvmw 194 (Kurland ed.).
6. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161 (1907).
1964]
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pointed to a redistricting act 7 that changed a square shaped city
into a bizarre, twenty-eight sided figure." The alleged effect of the
redistricting was the removal of virtually all the Negro voters
from the city, thereby excluding them from the benefits of
municipal residency, including the municipal franchise. In re-
viewing the dismissal of the complaint, the Supreme Court stated
that if plaintiffs' allegations remained uncontroverted they would
amount to a "mathematic demonstration" that the gerrymander
was aimed at depriving Negroes of their "pre-existing municipal
vote."' Looking to the "inescapable human effect" of the change,
the Court inferred that segregation of, and discrimination against,
Negroes was the primary purpose of the act.10 In reaching its
decision, the Court weighed the fact that the state had advanced
no "countervailing municipal function" to be served by the
legislation."
In the instant case, plaintiffs based their arguments upon a
violation of both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.12
The Michigan court appeared to accept the fifteenth amendment,
loss-of-vote, interpretation of Gomillion in distinguishing that
case on the ground that the petitioners in Gomillion were original
residents of the city and were deprived of a pre-existing right
to vote, while the plaintiffs in the instant case continued to reside
and vote in the village. This distinction, however, fails to meet
Mr. Justice Whittaker's concurring analysis in Gomillion that
one has no vested right to vote in a particular political unit.18
Even if the instant court's distinction were granted, it could still
7. Ala. Sess. Laws 1957, No. 140, at 185.
8. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960).
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id. at 347.
11. Id. at 342.
12. Plaintiffs were clearly relying on the equal protection approach since
they did not claim a denial of the right to vote. In two cases challenging a
New York reapportionment act, class acting Negro and Puerto Rican plain-
tiffs also relied on the fourteenth amendment. They contended that con-
gressional districts were gerrymandered in order to restrict them to a single
district. Honeywood v. Rockefeller, 214 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd per
curiam, 371 U.S. 1 (1963); Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), prob. juris. noted, 374 U.S. 803 (1963); see Note, Wright v. Rockefeller
and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions Plus a Problem
of Proof, 72 YALE L.J. 1041 (1968).
13. 364 U.S. at 349 (1960) (concurring opinion). Since the states have
authority to determine the qualifications for voting privileges and can also
manipulate boundaries of political units, it follows that one is not assured
that he will always cast his vote in a given political district. See Note, 72
YALE LJ. 1041, 1047-48 (1968).
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conceivably be argued that the plaintiffs in the instant case had
a pre-existing right to vote in a village that included the detached
strip.'4 The MVichigan court, however, undoubtedly meant to
indicate by this distinction that the Tuskegee plaintiffs had
actually been denied the right to vote. Certainly the majority
opinion in Gomillion, with its reliance on the fifteenth amend-
ment, suggests that this was the assumption underlying the
decision. Nonetheless, the loss of vote in Gomillion was not abso-
lute and unqualified.' 5 In addition, the Supreme Court may have
seized upon the fifteenth amendment as a way to avoid a decision
on legislative apportionment based on the equal protection
clause.'6
While not specifically addressing itself to the fourteenth
amendment, the court in the instant case distinguished Gomillion
because both white and Negro residents of Inkster Village were
excluded from the new city as a result of the detachment. The
court also pointed out that the plaintiffs were not prevented from
freely crossing back and forth from the village to the new city.
Although superficially compelling, these distinctions fail to dis-
pose of some considerations raised by an allegation of discrim-
ination based on the equal protection clause.
If classification based on race is unconstitutional per se,'T
14. Although the weight of the Negro vote in the village was increased
by the detachment, such a consideration is irrelevant in determining the
constitutionality of the detachment. Certainly the voting weight of the
Negroes ousted from Tuskegee would have been substantially greater in a
new municipality. See note 15 infra. See also Note, 72 YA r L.3. 1041, 1051-
56 (1963).
15. See Lucas, supra note 5, at 210, suggesting that the Negroes could have
established a separate municipality on petition of twenty-five persons and
voted there. But cf. 109 U. PA. L. flv. 1173, 1176 n-05 (1961), which indi-
cates that the petitioners in Gomill/no argued that registration to vote in
the new area would have been difficult.
16. See Lucas, supra note 5, at 231. Another explanation for the loss-of-
vote rationale is simply that the plaintiffs so framed the complaint. Id. at 213.
17. The per curiam decisions following Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (passing on the constitutionality of separate public accom-
modations) indicate that segregation based on race is unconstitutional per se.
See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958); Gayle v. Browder, 852 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955). That classification based on race is unconstitutional per se,
absent any segregation or discrimination, is not clear. See Note, 72 YMn LJ.
1041, 1048-50 (1963). If any use of race as a standard is unconstitutional per
se, then the "benign quota," see note 35 infra, would be invalid even though
the classification is aimed at achieving integration. Nonetheless, the use of
a racial standard would normally fail under the general requirements of the
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plaintiffs alleging discrimination under the equal protection clause
need only prove that race has been used as a standard for
classification- or as a basis for determining official boundaries
- and need not show any harm resulting from the classification,
the harm being an inevitable concomitant of the use of a racial
standard.'" Although freedom of access and equal effect on
whites 9 are factors indicating that boundaries were not drawn
in a discriminatory manner, standing alone they should hardly
be determinative of the issue.
In comparing only the number of white and Negro residents
of Inkster who were excluded from the city,20 the court failed to
make a more significant comparison, viz., the total number of
white and Negroes included in the new city. Such a comparison
would have revealed that the population of the new city com-
prised 80,000 whites from Dearborn Township and 2,980 whites
from Inkster Village; nine Negroes from Dearborn Township
and none from Inkster Village2' Nor should it have been a con-
sideration that the plaintiffs were not physically restrained from
crossing back and forth from the village to the new city. The
plaintiffs indicated that the outer limits of Negro residence in
the village were virtually co-extensive with the west boundary
of the strip.2 They feared that drawing the official limits of the
equal protection clause that the classification be reasonable and have some
relation to the purpose to be served. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457,
463-65 (1957); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18. Although -the harm associated with rigid segregation, with its signs,
barricades and police enforcement, is not present where race is used as a
basis for determining city boundaries, the psychological harm accompanying
knowledge that one has been excluded from a city on the basis of race alone
is equally as formidable. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954).
19. Treating Negroes and whites equally, however, does not always
indicate nondiscrimination. See Anderson v. Martin, 32 U.S.L. WmEr 1401
(U.S. Jan. 13, 1964), in which the United States Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a Louisiana statute requiring the race of both Negro and white
candidates to be designated on the ballot.
[B]y placing a racial label on a candidate ... the State furnishes a
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate
against one group because of race for another .... Therefore we view
the alleged equality as superficial....
Id. at 1402.
20. 11,120 whites and 4,600 Negroes were excluded. Instant case at 745.
21. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, pp. 4-5. The nine Negroes from Dear-
born Township who were included were assumed by plaintiffs to be live-in
domestics rather than homeowners.
22. The area of Negro residence began 1750 feet from the west boundary
of the strip. Instant case at 741.
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new city at that juncture would crystallize the boundary into
an "impenetrable wall" effectively circumscribing Negro residence
to that area. 3 It might be argued that the inclusion of Negroes
in the new city would not assure a more balanced dispersement
of the Negro population. Nonetheless, as residents and voters
of the city, the Negroes would have secured a voice, and perhaps
a measure of influence, in determining the policies of the city. 4
Although the plaintiffs in the instant case did not have the
graphic proof that led the Supreme Court in Gomi/lion to find a
"mathematic demonstration" of discrimination, the Michigan
court should have concluded that they had established enough
to support an inference of discrimination. Whether plaintiffs are
required to disprove all possible alternative inferences before a
prima facie case is established becomes important, since most
plaintiffs rarely have direct evidence of discrimination. A nega-
tive answer is suggested by the Gomillion decision.-25 Once the
Gomiliom plaintiffs had established that they had been excluded
from the-city, the burden shifted to the state to overcome the
inference of discrimination by showing a "countervailing munici-
pal function."2 6 While the Supreme Court did not intimate the
23. Plaintiffs argued that Negroes would not be able to move into the
new city at wilL Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, p. 22. The argument may
have merit. When residents of Dearborn mistook a Negro moving van
worker for a new tenant, the residence was stoned. The homeowner is now
suing the city, alleging that the Dearborn police failed to restrain the mob.
Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, Sept. 8, 1963, p. 8A, cols. 5, Q. Similar events
have occurred throughout the country when Negroes have attempted to
move into all-white areas. See McGhee & Ginger, The Houwe I Live In, 46
Co1NEmE L.Q. 194, 245 nn.AS0-33 (1961). See also Googer v. City of Atlanta,
8 R&CE Rm. L. REP. 179 (Fulton County Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1963) where
the city birricaded the streets to separate Negro and white residential
districts.
24. A number of cities and states have enacted fair housing legislation to
deal with "private" discrimination in housing. See 4 REPoRT oF TnE U.S.
Co-Ase.i oN Civm RiGnus 121-38, App. VI, tables 1, 2 (1959). The Michigan
law regulates only public housing developments. See Mich. Pub. Acts 1952,
No. 101, p. 112. A ruling of the Michigan Corporation and Securities Com-
mission required all real estate brokers to discharge their professional duties
without discrimination, under penalty of license revocation. This regulation
was struck down in McKibbin v. Michigan Corp. & See. Comm'n, Ingham
County, 7 RAcE E .L. REP. 851 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 4, 1902). See Kinsey,
Riue Nine-A Novel AWproach?, 39 U. DET. LJ. 10B (1901).
25. But cf. Honeywood v. Rockefeller, 214 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.N.Y. 1963);
Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460 (S-D.N.Y. 1962).
26. On remand, an Alabama district court held the act unconstitutional
and the city was enjoined from enforcing it. No oral argument was heard.
See TARs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 116.
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effect a showing of a "municipal function" would have had upon
the Gomillion decision, the test should be viewed in light of the
Court's refusal to recognize the "rational reason" and "state
regulatory power" doctrines where the effect of state action has
been to subject minorities to unequal treatment.2 7 Properly ap-
plied, the municipal function test should require the state to
show not only a legitimate state purpose, but also that the means
chosen to implement that purpose were not chosen to create a
discriminatory result.8 Courts must look beyond the facade of
state power and require more than tenuous justifications for the
action taken.
The court in the instant case suggested that the incorpo-
rators had no duty to show a legitimate municipal function,"
yet it did present justifications sufficient to overcome any infer-
ence of discrimination arising from the facts alleged by plain-
tiffs. The incorporators showed (a) that it was legally, practically,
and politically necessary to join the noncontiguous areas in order
to incorporate them; 0 (b) that previous efforts to incorporate
the entire village had failed for lack of the requisite majority
vote;31 (c) that the strip taken was three blocks wide, leaving
as much area as possible to the village; 2 (d) that the strip af-
forded convenient water and sewer connections; and (e) that the
west boundary was drawn to correspond with the first available
27. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539 (1968) (legislative investigative right cannot compel disclosure of
NAACP membership lists); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (state
power to regulate the bar cannot be used to curtail civil rights litigation);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (integration of schools cannot be
delayed to preserve public peace).
28. This test requires the state to show that no feasible alternative means
were available to accomplish the purpose. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960):
The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
29. Instant case at 742. The court did not shift the burden to the state
since it ruled the plaintiffs had not established enough to raise an inference
of discrimination.
30. Instant case at 740.
31. See note 3 supra.
32. The political nature of the controversy in the instant case may have
had some influence on the decision. After the village's efforts to halt the
detachment failed, supra note 8, the council unanimously passed a resolution
stating that the fight to preserve the village would be continued, authorizing
the attorneys to petition for rehearing of the earlier case and recommending
a citizen's complaint on the racial issue. Brief for Defendant-Respondents,
p. 35.
[Vol. 48
CASE COMMENTS
major street and not to correspond with the Negro district 3
While in the instant case the incorporators' justifications were
adequate to fulfill the test, in Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress
Dev. Corp.," a recent Illinois case, the municipal function test
was construed to require no more than a showing of a legitimate
33. This final explanation presents a thorny problem since major streets
are often the dividing line between areas of Negro and white residency, but
are also natural cut-off points for official boundaries. See Honeywood v.
Rockefeller, 214 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). It would seem that
other facts would also have-to be present, as in the instant case, to uphold
the use of that boundary. One area in which official and ghetto boundaries
frequently correspond is school districts. Since the educational system in
most communities is based on the neighborhood school concept and since
the minority ghetto is widespread, de facto segregated schools often arise.
Where it can be shown that the state has intentionally gerrymandered bounda-
ries of school districts, the districting will not be upheld. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Pasadena City School Dist., 31 Cal. Rep. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963); Taylor
v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). There is also some support for the position
that where the school board fails to update districts for racial reasons, such
inaction will not be upheld. See Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150,
153 (EI).N.Y. 1962) (dictum). It has even been asserted that there is an
affirmative duty on the board to alleviate racial imbalance in the schools. See
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., eupra at 610, 382 P.2d at 882 (dictum).
Contra, Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (NJ). Ind. 1963); Evans
v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962), 15 ST". L. REv. 681 (1963).
Plaintiffs in these cases often face a difficult problem in proving that the
district has been gerrymandered. Evans v. Buchanan, supra at 825, held that
a presumption of racial districting arises where all the pupils and teachers
are Negro. The court also indicated that less compelling facts might also sup-
port a presumption. Id. at 825 n.12. The burden then shifts to the state to
show that legitimate criteria have been used in drawing the boundaries on the
grounds that the evidence is in the hands of those who planned the districts.
Id. at 824--25. See Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part 1:
The New Rochele Experien e, 58 Nw. U.L. lay. 1, 157 (1963):
Certainly where a heavy burden of proof is placed upon a school board
to show that racial zoning does not exist, the board might have as diffi-
cult a task as the Negro plaintiffs would have proving its existence.
Id. at 170 n.51. See also, RPORT O TME US. CO M'N oN Crvm vi Rs 53-70
(1963); Maslow, DeFacto Public School Segregation, 6 Vim.. L. Rnv. 353
(1961); Note, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 722 (1963).
34. Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 EL 2d 132, 174 N.E2d
850 (1961) (first appeal); 26 Ill. 2d 296, 186 N.E.2d 360 (1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 968 (1963). The company also sued in the federal court for injunctive
relief, but was unsuccessful. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681
(N.D. Ill. 1960), 35 NoRE D~Am LAw. 563; aff'd in part, reversed in part,
286 F .d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). For a fictionalized account of the Deerfield
story, see RosEN & RosEN, Buy NOT Ntmr DooR (1962). Compare City of
Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, 329 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1959). Contra, Wiley v.
Richland Water Dist., 5 RAcE Rmi. L. REP. 788 (D. Ore. June 30, 1960).
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purpose and a governmental power. In Deerfield the city invoked
the power of eminent domain to prevent a real estate company
from completing a subdivision in which the developers planned
to sell homes according to the "benign quota" theory85 If the
municipal function test had been applied as suggested above,
the city would have been required to articulate the circumstances
surrounding the condemnation of the particular tract of land
taken 8
It has been suggested that issues analogous to those raised
by the instant case are more properly resolved in the political
sphere than in the courts; 7 but techniques inherent in the legal
process, such as judicial noticess and the inductive process of
reasoning,"9 provide the courts with means to adjudicate these
See also REPORT OF THE U.S. CoTrnM'r ON CiviL RIGHTS 161-62 (1903),
indicating that land condemned for a public park in Memphis in 1000 to pre-
vent Negroes from moving into the area has never been used for that purpose.
35. The benign quota is a method used by some private real estate devel-
opers to introduce and maintain a "proper" interracial composition in a com-
munity- the number of units sold or rented to Negroes and whites is con-
trolled by the developer. The constitutionality of this plan has been ques-
tioned. See generally Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An
Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YAxm L.J. 1887 (1062); Hellerstein, The Be-
nign Quota, Equal Protection and "The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RuTaEn
L. Rav. 531 (1968); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J.
30 (1960). For a discussion of other problems in this area see Gnin, Pas-
VATELY DEVELOPED INNTERRACaAL HOUSING (1960).
36. One important factor would have been that two previous park board
referenda had been defeated. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp.
681, 696 (ND. Ill. 1960). Other circumstances surrounding the condemnation
were also brought out in the federal court.
The whole community was thrown into an uproar ... when it became
known ...that some of the houses would be sold to Negroes....
Mass meetings were held, protests were lodged and committees were
formed to resist the sales program of Progress.
Id. at 705-06.
37. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 4. See also Taylor v. Board of Educ.,
191 F. Supp. 181, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
38. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963) (Negro civil
rights movement has engendered resentment by whites in Virginia); Garner
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 194 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (racial tension
in Louisiana notorious); Hernandez v. State, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (com-
munity attitude toward Mexicans). The court in the instant case took judi-
cial notice of the facts presented in Googer v. City of Atlanta, 8 RIAc" REL.
L. REP. 179 (Fulton County Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1963), see note 23 supra,
and the pattern of racially concentrated housing in the village as well as
the nationwide agitation in the civil rights field. Instant case at 743 & n.5.
39. Inferring purpose from a consideration of the consequences attendant
to the use of a state power has often been done. See Howell, Legislative Mo-
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controversies. If the states continue to use their political powers
for discriminatory purposes, and the normal political processes
fail to dispose of the issues, the courts will continue to be the
forum used by minorities to secure equal treatment.40
NLRB: Reversal of Back-Pay Tolling Rule-
Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure Act
The National Labor Relations Board recently abandoned its
long-standing practice of tolling back-pay awards for the period
between a trial examiner's decision that an unfair labor practice
complaint be dismissed' and the date of the Board's decision to
the .contrary? The Board ordered an employer to offer an em-
ployee who had been wrongfully discharged reinstatement and
back pay for the full period from the date of the discharge to
the date of the offer of reinstatement 3 On appeal, the Court of
tive and Legislative Purpose in the Invalidation of a Civil Rights Statute, 47
VA. L. Rv. 439, 457 n.68 and cases cited therein. See also, Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
- 40.
Under the conditions of modem government, litigation may well be
-the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress
of grievances.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,430 (1963). See also GREENuERO, RAcE RiLs-
TiONS AND AmncAw LAw 59 (1959); Kaplan, supra note 33, at 211; Papale,
Judicial Enforcement of Desegregation- Its Problems and Limitations, 52 Nw.
U.L. Rnv. 301 (1957).
1. A charge alleging that an unfair labor practice has been or is being
committed must be filed with a regional director of the NLRB. If it appears
that formal proceedings should be instituted, the General Counsel of the
NLRB issues a complaint stating the essence of the charge and containing a
notice of a hearing before a trial examiner. After the hearing the trial exam-
iner issues an intermediate report and recommended order, now called the
trial, examiner's decision, which is filed with the Board and served on the
parties. See 28 Fed. Reg. 7972-73 (1963), amending 29 C.F. §§ 102.9-15,
102.45(a) (1963).
2. The unfair labor practices to which the tolling procedure had applied
were violations of §§ 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act,
61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(8), (b)(2) (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1962). The former section
makes it unfair for an employer to encourage or discourage membership in
a labor organization by discrimination in regard to hire, tenure of employ-
ment, or any term or condition of employment. The latter section makes it
unfair for a labor organization to either encourage an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of the former section or to discriminate
against an employee in certain respects.
3. A. P. W. Prods. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 25 (1962).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit granted enforcement of the order
and held that the Board had not abused its discretion by reversing
its policy of tolling back-pay awards. NLRB v. A. P. W. Prods.
Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
The practice of tolling back-pay awards for the period between
a trial examiner's decision of dismissal and the Board's decision
to the contrary was first applied in the case of E. R. Haffelfinger
Co.,4 during the Board's first year of operation. Following that
case, the Board continued to toll back pay.' Tolling was prac-
ticed whether the trial examiner based his decision of dismissal
upon a finding of no unfair labor practices or upon a finding that
the NLRB lacked jurisdiction.'
In the instant case, the Second Circuit properly declined to
weigh the merits of the NLRB's decision to adopt a non-tolling
4. 1 N.L.R.B. 760 (1936). In Bell Oil & Gas Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 562 (1936),
decided one month earlier, the Board had not tolled back pay on similar facts.
5. See, e.g., Wix Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 1059 (1961); International Union of
Elect. Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1961); Time-O-Matic, Inc., 121 N.L.UB.
179 (1958); Mitchell Plastics, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 597 (1957); Banner Die
Fixture Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1692 (1956) (back pay tolled between interme-
diate report recommending dismissal and date of remand for a new hearing);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 113 N.L.R.B. 655 (1955); Utah
Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 196 (1951); Williams Coal Co., 11 NL.B. 579
(1939); The Grace Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 766 (1938); Palmer, Back-Pay Awards
Under the National Labor Relations Act: Matters of Defense, 29 Gno. L.J.
580, 592-93 (1941). But see Willard, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1937), in which
the Board failed to toll back pay where the trial examiner found no unfair
labor practices and dismissed the complaint but recommended reinstatement;
the Board later found a violation based on findings of another trial examiner.
6. See Smith, 131 N.L.R.B. 513 (1961) (lack of jurisdiction); Interior
Enterprises, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290-91 & n.7 (1959) (lack of jurisdic-
tion). However, where the trial examiner found unfair labor practices yet
recommended dismissal for lack of jurisdiction but the Board on review
found jurisdiction as well as unfair labor practices, tolling of back pay was
denied. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 140, 164-65 (1937),
enforced, 98 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 643 (1939); of.
Modem Linen & Laundry Serv., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1974 (1956) (no tolling
between Board dismissal and Board decision following reversal and remand
by appellate court). But cf. Oregon Teamsters' Security Plan Office, 119
N.L.R.B. 207 (1957) (tolling between Board dismissal and Board supple-
mental decision following reversal and remand by Supreme Court). See also
B. V. D. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1455 (1957). Compare Whiterock Quarries, Inc.,
5 N.L.R.B. 601 (1938); Kentucky Firebrick Co., 3 N.LA.B. 455 (1937). For
a thorough examination of the various criteria affecting the amount and
period of back pay ordered by the Board in decisions up to 1953, see Daykin,
Back Pay Under the National Labor Relations Act, 39 IOWA L. Rav. 104
(1953). See also Note, Back Pay Orders Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1265 (1939).
6CASE COMMENTS
rule. Whether a proposed rule or policy violates the express stat-
utory language or the clear purpose of an act is a question that
most authorities consider subject to judicial review.7 The alterna-
tives of tolling or non-tolling of back pay, however, both clearly
lie within the scope of the NLRA.s Thus, the only question is
which alternative will better effectuate the policies underlying
that act. Such a policy question is within the expert knowledge
and accumulated experience of an administrative agency and not
necessarily within the competence of a reviewing court; sub-
stitution of judicial judgment in such a situation would be
undesirableY
That the Board had the substantive power to reverse its well-
established practice of tolling back-pay awards is fairly clear;"0
but it probably should have promulgated its non-tolling rule in
the manner prescribed for substantive rules by section 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act." The Board has the authority
under the NLRA to "make, amend, and rescind, in the manner
7. E.g., Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Hnv. L. Rsv. 39,
261 (1955); Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Ad-
mnistrative Process, 28 Fonraar L. REv. 1, 87 (1959); see 'TURB v. Seven-
Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953).
8. Section 10(c) of the NLRA provides that where the Board determines
that an unfair labor practice has been or is being committed, it may reinstate
employees "with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies" of the
act. 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U..C. § 160(c) (1958). Tie Board
has always been allowed broad discretion in fashioning remedies to effectuate
the -policies of the NLRA. See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344
U.S. 344, 348-49 (1953); Virginia Elect. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533,
53940 (1943). Originally, in fact, the Board had adopted a non-tolling
practice. See Bell Oil & Gas Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 562 (1936).
9. See 4 DAvis, AnmnyTaATivE LAw § 30.01, at 191 (1958); Jaffe, supra
note 7, at 261; Kramer, supra note 7, at 87.
10. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. Congressional approval of
the Board's original tolling practice, evidenced by two major amendments
to the NLRA without pertinent modification of § 10(c), Labor-lIanagement
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519,
cannot be taken to indicate an intention to freeze this interpretation into a
statutory mandate. Instead, such approval at most indicates acquiescence in
the -propriety of this interpretation. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
344U.S. 344 (1953).
11. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U-S.C. § 1003 (1958). Under this provision a
general notice of the proposed rule making, including the substance of the
proposed rule, must be published in the Federal Register. Interested persons
are afforded an opportunity to participate in the rule making through sub-
mission of data, views, and arguments. The rule adopted must then be
published in the Federal Register not less than 30 days prior to the effective
date thereof.
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prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of the
NLRA.1 2 Assuming this to be a "rule" as defined by the APA,8
the Second Circuit might well have reversed on the ground of an
improper rule-making procedure. The instant court recognized,
however, that the Board has discretion in deciding whether to
make rules in this manner or to establish them through adjudica-
tion of individual cases 14 in the method prescribed by sections 5,
7, and 8 of the APA. 15
As a matter of practice the NLRB has always set forth its
substantive policies and practices in conjunction with its pub-
lished case decisions and opinions;16 the Board viewing itself as
a quasi-judicial rather than a rule-making agency. Rule making
is thought to be too inflexible a means of dealing with the com-
plex factual situations arising out of labor-management relations.
Adjudication is considered more desirable because of the establish-
ment of precedents identified with the facts of particular cases.'
Although generally the Board may be correct, its rationale, as
applied to the non-tolling rule, is not persuasive. Situations to
which the non-tolling rule applies are not factually varying and
complex. In fact, the rule as stated by the Board expressly tran-
12. National Labor Relations Act § 6, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 156 (1958).
13. "'Rule' means the whole or any part of any agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . ." Administrative Procedure Act §
2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958).
14. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 832 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); NLRB v.
E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
908 (1961); 1 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.01 (1958); Note, Administra-
tive Law Making Through Adjudication: The National Labor Relations
Board, 45 MmN. L. RV. 609, 652 (1961).
15. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 7, & 8, 60 Stat. 239, 241, 242
(1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1006, 1007 (1958).
16. See Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961 Before the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 137, 146 (1961).
17. See ibid.; STAFF OF HOUSE CoMm. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH
CONG., lST Sss., SURVEY AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION,
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL AGENCms-AGENCY REsI'oNsE
TO QUESTIONNAIRE 1810-11 (Comm. Print 1957). Recently, it was forcefully
argued that the NLRB has abused its discretion in following this course of
action. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALEa L.J. 729 (1961). Professor Peck even suggests that
the Board's failure to use the formal rule-making provisions of the APA in
appropriate situations may be a violation of, rather than an alternative to,
these provisions. Id. at 754-55.
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scends the facts of the instant case,' and it appears that this deci-
sion was merely a vehicle to announce the change in policy. ' In
this situation, there are even additional arguments favoring gen-
eral rather than adjudicatory rule making.-20 This is not a new
situation about which the Board needs to accumulate expertise
before formulating a general rule21 - this question was "ripe" for
rule making. Furthermore, interested persons were unable to pre-
sent arguments on the issue of tolling back-pay awards - -2 formal
rule making, however, provides for a public hearing" for formula-
tion of rules of general applicability. Indeed, the parties them-
selves, since they were not notified of an anticipated change in
the Board's decision, made no arguments on the point.2 4 Finally,
any problem of retroactivity could have been avoided had the
Board acted in its legislative rule-making capacity.25
18. The Board's opinion concluded:
we now hold that in this case and in all similar cases hereafter decided,
where backpay or other reimbursement is part of the appropriate
remedy, we shall make such award for the full period from the date of
the discrimination to the date of an offer of reinstatement . . . or
other cut off date found in the particular case, regardless of the nature
of the Trial Examiner's recommendation.
137 N-.:RB. at 31. The rule was also said to apply to proceedings involving
violations of § 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U..C. § 158(b)
(2) (1958).
19. This is not the first time the Board has used a particular case as a
vehicle for announcing a policy of future general application. See the discus-
sion in Summers, PolitiCs, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRAcusE L. Rnv.
93, 105-06 (1954).
20. See generally Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach- Which
Should It Be, 22 LAw & CorEaP. PRoB. 660-65 (1957).
21. The tolling concept has been present since 1936. See note 4 aupra and
accompanying text. The Board stated in the instant case that they recently
had given extensive consideration to this problem. 137 NILR.B. at 29.
22. An analysis of adjudicative, as opposed to formal rule making, indi-
cates that procedure under the latter is not oppressive or burdensome nor
has it. resulted in hinderance or delay in the disposition of specific cases.
Peck, supra note 17, at 733-34, 758-59.
23. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1003(b) ,(1958).
24. There -was, as a result, a failure of the adversary system. However,
the strong dissent by two of the Board members on the merits of tolling
back pay probably justified the Second Circuit in finding that the Board had
all of the relevant arguments before it. Compare NLRB v. E & B Brewing
Co., 276 F.2d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1960).
25. The Board could apply a number of alternative tests: (1) any portion
of the period that occurred before the effective date of the new rule could
be tolled as before, and the remainder of such period left untolled; (2) the
old tolling rule could apply only to those cases in which the trial examiner's
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Assuming, however, that the non-tolling rule was properly es-
tablished through adjudication, the Board might well have ap-
plied this decision prospectively and thereby avoided the unde-
sirable consequences which generally accompany retroactive
application of a new rule or policy.20 Arguably, the employer in
the instant case relied on the old rule of not assessing back pay
for the period between the trial examiner's report and the Board
decision; if it had known of the Board's anticipated rule change
it might have rehired the discharged employee after receiving the
intermediate report and avoided back-pay liability during this
period.
It seems, however, that the Second Circuit properly refused to
review the Board's retroactive application of the non-tolling rule.
Courts generally uphold the retroactive application of adminis-
trative rules or policies unless the prejudice or hardship from
such application outweighs the benefit to be obtained.27 Since
respondent was not penalized for conduct that the Board had pre-
viously ignored or approved and since respondent was not sub-
stantially prejudiced by reliance on the previously followed tolling
policy, enforcement of the Board's decision was justified. The
existence of the tolling rule probably had no effect on the em-
ployer's decision to discharge the employee in this case; a com-
pany seldom would rehire, even in the absence of a tolling rule,
an employee whose discharge had been approved by a trial exam-
iner.28 Only where the dispute is one of law as yet unsettled by
report was filed before the non-tolling rule went into effect; (3) the old
tolling rule could apply only to those actions started before the effective
date of the non-tolling rule; or (4) all unfair labor practices occurring before
the promulgation of the non-tolling rule could be governed by the old rule.
26. Courts have the inherent power to apply new rules of law prospec-
tively, and on occasion they have done so to avoid injustice or hardship.
Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). It fol-
lows that administrative agencies should also have such an option in the
adjudication of cases. See NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141,
148-49 (9th Cir. 1952).
27. See, e.g., Pedersen v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1950); NLRB v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Supreme Court held that the evils of retroactivity
must be balanced against the harm resulting from a decision contrary to
statutory design or legal and equitable principles.
The general scope of judicial review of agency action is set out in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 109(e)
(1958).
28. Trial examiners' opinions are highly reliable: 20 to 25% of all inter-
mediate reports are accepted without contest by the parties. Over 70% of
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the Board - such as in a test case concerning the fairness of cer-
tain labor practices or the extension of NLRB jurisdiction into
a new industry - would an employer possibly offer reinstatement
to an employee after a favorable decision by the trial examiner,
because of the higher possibility of a contrary ruling by the Board.
This was clearly not the situation in the instant case.
On the merits, the non-tolling rule may tend to discourage un-
fair labor practices, but its effect on labor relations will probably
not be great, partly because the particular situations to which
the rule applies occur infrequently. For the five-year period from
fiscal 1956 to 1960, only 8.5% of the contested trial examiners'
reports were reversed in full by the Board, and only 17.6% were
reversed in parte"
The non-tolling rule should, however, have a fairly substantial
effect in favor of the policy underlying the awarding of back pay
and the Board's other remedial orders - the restoration as com-
pletely as possible to what would have obtained but for the dis-
criminatory discharge 0 Moreover, the effect of the non-tolling
rule on the individual to a dispute, although of secondary im-
portance, seems favorable. An employer or a union that has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice is the "wrongdoer" and thus
should assume the additional back-pay liability. Also, even if
both parties were equally at fault, an employer or unions ' is gen-
erally financially better able to pay the additional back pay than
is an employee able to go without it. The dissenting Board mem-
bers contended in this case that a tolling rule is desirable because
a respondent should not be penalized for his reliance on a trial
examiner's reportf2 That the trial examiner's report was ever
intended to be relied on, however, is unlikely; its purpose is rather
to aid the Board in its ultimate disposition of the case.' The
basis for the tolling rule was that respondents did rely and should
the contested decisions are affirmed in full by the Board on review; another
17-18% are affirmed in part. Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 5, supra
note 16, at 143.
29. Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 5, supra note 16, at 143.
So. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.. 177, 194 (1941), cited by
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB. 289, 292 (1950), and A. P. W. Prods. Co.,
137 N.LT .B. 25, 29 (1962); Dayldn, supra note 6, at 104.
31. Labor organizations, as well as employers, that are responsible for
discriminatory labor practices may be assessed back pay under § 10(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1958).
82. 137 N.L.RB. at 33, 35.
33. See Automotive Proving Grounds, Inc., 139 N.L.RB. 431 n.1 (1962).
The trial examiner's responsibility, as an agent of the Board, is to compile
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not be penalized for it, 4 but the competing considerations pre-
viously mentioned seem to justify the majority's decision to aban-
don the old rule in spite of such reliance.
A change in the posture of the Board, with the appointment
of two new members (Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown)
early in 1961, apparently has led to a change in Board policy.
Chairman McCulloch, speaking at the Federal Bar Association's
annual convention later that year, stated that the Board was
studying various ways of taking the profit out of unfair labor
practices and that it intended to impose harsher remedies in the
face of the growing number of such practices.55 The reversal of
the long-standing tolling practice in the instant case may evi-
dence a shifting policy emphasizing a greater concern for the in-
dividual employees.
NLRB: Purchases From or Sales to
Interstate Enterprise Satisfies
Jurisdiction Requirements
Respondent corporation purchased fuel oil and related prod-
ucts from a supplier engaged in interstate commerce. Respondent
itself did not engage in interstate commerce; all of its sales were
made to New York homeowners and all of its purchases were
an adequate and compact record, including a report containing detailed find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order. This intermediate
report is in effect an initial decision on both facts and law. Hearings on the
Administration of the Labor-Management Act by the NLRB Before the
Subcommittee on National Labor Relation8 Board of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 143 (1961).
The trial examiner's decision is filed with the Board and copies are served
on the parties. If no exceptions are taken, the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the trial examiner are automatically adopted by the
Board. If exceptions are filed the case comes before the Board for disposition.
28 Fed. Reg. 7974 (1968), amending 29 C.F.R. § 102.48 (1968). In fiscal 1902,
82% of the cases which went to formal hearing before a trial examiner were
contested before the Board. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 14 (1962).
84. See E. R. Haffelfinger Co., 1 N.LR.B. 760, 767 (1986).
35. See 48 LAB. REL. REP. 657 (1961). Between 1957 and 1962 the number
of unfair labor practice charges submitted to the NLRB annually has nearly
doubled. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 1 (1962).
For another example of the Board's new policy, see NLRB Press Release,
No. 886, Sept. 21, 1963. See generally Comment, Labor Law's Now Frontier:
The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. IND. & Comx. L. Rav. 487, 400 (1962).
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made within that state.' Nevertheless, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board found that respondent's unfair labor practices2 "af-
fected commerce" because respondent had made substantial pur-
chasesP from a supplier engaged in interstate commerce. The
Board issued a cease-and-desist order and petitioned the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit for enforcement. Enforcement was
denied on the ground that neither the size of a local business nor
the amount of its purchases from interstate suppliers sufficiently
demonstrates that a labor dispute would "affect commerce." 4 On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that the NLRB has jurisdiction over intrastate businesses that
purchase goods from suppliers engaged in interstate commerce.
NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress en-
dowed the NLRB with the fullest jurisdictional breadth permis-
sible under the commerce clause,5 by vesting in the Board juris-
diction over those labor disputes that "affect commerce."8 Under
the commerce clause, Congress has the power to regulate not only
interstate activities but also intrastate activities that have such
1. Respondent purchased several hundred dollars worth of goods in New
Jersey, but these purchases were treated as de m7inim. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp., 129 N.LRMB. 1166, 1170-71 (1961).
2. The NLRB found that respondent had coerced its employees into join-
ing a union favored by it, thereby violating §§ 8(a)(1)-(3), (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1)-(3), (5) (1958).
3. Respondent's purchases exceeded $500,000. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.,
129 N.LRJB. 1166, 1170 (1961).
4. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1901). The
court of appeals desired to know what respondent's contractual relationship
with the interstate enterprise was, the proportion of respondent's purchases
from that enterprise to the enterprise's total sales in the relevant market,
the number and availability of alternate distributors who would be able to
supply respondent's customers, as well as other possible relevant facts that
would provide a reasonably complete picture of the manner in which a work
stoppage would affect commerce.
5. See, e.g., Polish Nat'l Alliance of the United States v. NLRB, 322 U.S.
643, 647-48 (1944); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
6. Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49
Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958), empowers the
NLRB "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in section 8) affecting commerce." Section 2(6) of the act defines "com-
merce" to mean "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States . . ." and § 2(7) declares "the term 'affecting com-
merce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce ....
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a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens or obstructions.' The criterion for determining whether
activities have a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce is the effect on interstate commerce, not the source of in-
jury.' Congress' exertion of power need not await an actual dis-
ruption of that commerce; it is entitled to provide reasonable
preventive measures. 9 The particular volume of interstate com-
merce affected has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction, so
long as the volume is more than that to which the courts would
apply the maxim de minimis."°
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB
had properly found that by virtue of respondent's purchases from
a supplier engaged in interstate commerce, respondent's unfair
labor practices "affected commerce." Respondent's labor prac-
tices did not actually affect commerce; neither purchases nor
transportation of products across state lines were diminished."
Congress defined the term "affecting commerce," however, to en-
compass potential as well as actual effects on interstate com-
merce in order to empower the Board to resolve labor disputes
before they actually disrupt commerce. 2 The Second Circuit rec-
ognized this fact, but questioned the reasonableness of the Board's
determination that the purchases created a potential effect suffi-
cient to give the Board jurisdiction." The cases14 and quoted lan-
guage' 5 relied on by the Supreme Court indicate that the reason-
7. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Note,
43 GEo. L.J. 67, 73 (1954).
8. Thus, activities of an employer who is neither in commerce nor ships
anything in commerce are subject to Congress' control. Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1938); see Stern, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. Rav. 645, 684 (1946).
9. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1938).
10. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
11. If there had been an actual effect, no one could reasonably question
the Board's jurisdiction. See note 35 infra.
12. See note 6 supra; Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
222 (1938).
13. The court of appeals did not feel that the record disclosed information
sufficient to demonstrate the manner in which a labor dispute would affect
commerce. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
14. Polish Nat'l Alliance of the United States v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643
(1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 300
U.S. 601 (1939).
15. The Court quoted from Polish Alliance:
Whether or not practices may be deemed by Congress to affect
interstate commerce is not to be determined by confining judgment
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ableness of the Board's determination is not to be tested by the
quantitative effect of the activities immediately before it, but by
the total potential effect of similar situations throughout the coun-
try. The Court relied principally on Polish Alliance v. NLRB,10
NLRB v. Fainblatt,17 and Wickard v. Filbum. In those cases the
Court held that even though the effect of the immediate activities
on interstate commerce is insignificant, the existence of similar
situations throughout the country is evidence of a potential harm
of sufficient magnitude to interstate commerce to give Congress
the power to regulate all of them. The fact that there was no evi-
dence in the instant case of the respondent's activities indicates
that in future cases the NLRB need not even demonstrate the
representative nature of the activities immediately before it, even
though the amount of purchases is insignificant.10 Since the eco-
nomic effect of making sales to a company would seem to be the
same as those resulting from purchases,2 0 the instant case should
be read to give the Board jurisdiction over employers who either
purchase goods from or sell goods to companies engaged in inter-
state commerce.2'
to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the
Board. Appropriate for judgment is .the fact that the immediate situa-
tion is representative of many others throughout the country, the total
incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its
harm to commerce.
Instant case at 226.
16. 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
17. 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
18. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
19. See Kingsbury Electric Co-op. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 387 (8th Cir.
1963) ($70,000); NLRB v. Fiore Bros. Oil Co., 317 F2d 710 (2d Cir. 1963)
(over $50,000); NLRB v. Citizens Hotel Co., 313 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1963)
(over $50,000); Tinley Park Dairy Co., 142 N.LILB. No. 80 (May 17, 1963)
($56,000); Admiral Welding & Boiler Maintenance, 141 N.LR"B. No. 68
(March 25, 1963) ("a couple of thousand dollars"); City Line Open Hearth,
Inc., 141 N-T.IR.B. No. 74 (Mach 26, 1963) ($10,000).
20. See Santa Cruz Fruit Pacldng Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938);
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 101 F-ad 841 (4th
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 241 (1939); NLRB v. A. S. Abell Co.,
97 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1938).
21. See NLRIB v. Benevento, 316 Fa2d 224 (1st Cir. 1963), enforcing 138
NT.LR.B. 110 (1962); Southern Dolomite, 129 NTL.R.B. 1342 (1961).
It is immaterial whether the goods ever cross state lines. In NLItB v.
Benevento, supra, a local employer supplied sand and gravel to a company
that mixed the sand and gravel with cement purchased outside the state and
then sold the mixture to consumers within the state. Although the sand and
gravel never left the state, the local employer was held to be subject to the
Board's jurisdiction. See also NLRB v. Bill Daniels, Inc., 202 F.d 579 (6th
1964]
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Since the NLRB's resources are limited and its potential juris-
diction has been extended to cover practically every industry, no
matter how small, 2 the Board has been forced to limit its asser-
tion of jurisdiction to those cases having a substantial impact on
interstate commerce.P To facilitate this, the Board has estab-
lished monetary jurisdictional requirements.24 The Board has di-
vided the country's industries into approximately ten categories
Cir. 1953), rev'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 918 (1954).
In addition, the purchase or sale of services is not distinguishable from
the purchase or sale of goods. See Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B.
81 (1958); Hygienic Sanitation Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 103O (1957).
22. See Fatzer, More State Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes Recommended,
24 J.B.A. KAN. 223, 224 (1956). See also Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 Hasv. L. REv. 1297, 1299 (1954). In NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d
805 (9th Cir. 1953), a dry cleaning establishment located on government
property was held to be subject to the Board's jurisdiction because it pur-
chased $12,000 worth of goods outside the state. See Lamar Hotel, 127
N.L.R.B. 885 (1960) (purchase of $4,900 worth of goods).
23. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958).
24. Prior to 1950, the NLRB determined whether it would exercise juris-
diction over labor disputes within its full statutory (legal) jurisdiction on an
ad hoe or case-by-case approach. 89 LA.RR.M. 44 (1957); see Cohen, Congress
Clears the Labor No Man's Land: A Long Awaited Solution Spawns a Host
of New Problems, 56 Nw. U.L. Ray. 333, 885 (1961). In 1950, the Board
adopted written standards to aid in deciding whether jurisdiction should be
exercised. These were announced in Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
685 (1950), and a group of companion cases. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 & n.10
(1950). These standards reflected, for the most part, results reached by the
ad hoe approach. Id. at 5. They were not intended to bind the Board in its
exercise of jurisdiction and permitted the Board to decline jurisdiction over
entire groups of employers without the necessity of examining the particular
facts relevant to each individual employer's operation. See 16 NLRB ANN.
REP. 15-89 (1951); 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1029 & n.16 (1959). The standards
were revised in 1954 with the view of further restricting the Board's jurisdic-
tion. See Symposium, NLRB Jurisdictional Standards and State Jurisdiction,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. 190 (1955). These were announced in NLRB Press Release,
No. 467, Oct. 28, 1954, together with the first cases formulating and apply-
ing the new standards. In 1958 new jurisdictional standards were promul-
gated in order to extend the labor policies embodied in the Wagner Act as
close to the legal limits of the Board's jurisdiction as possible. These standards
were announced in NLRB Press Release, R-576, Oct. 2, 1958, and are
enumerated in 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 7-12 (1958); 42 L.R.R.M. 90-97 (1958);
Comment, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 737, 747-48 (1960). In 1959 the standards
were extended to include the hotel industry. NLRB Press Release, No. 610,
May 14, 1959; 44 L.R.R.M. 70 (1959). Those standards announced in 1958
and 1959 are the standards presently in force. See note 19 supra. See gen-
erally Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, 70 YAsE L.J. 729, 735-38 (1961).
In 1959 Congress approved this method of declining jurisdiction. See note
38 infra; Michael Benevento, 138 N.L.R.B. 110 (1962).
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and established minimum monetary standards for each category.25
The monetary standards are basically of two types: the first util-
izes an inflow and outflow test25 the second utilizes a gross volume
test. The monetary standard for the non-retail category, for ex-
ample, utilizes an inflow and outflow test. If a non-retailer's pur-
chases from or sales to suppliers engaged in interstate commerce
exceeds $50,000, the monetary jurisdictional requirement is met?-
The monetary standard for the retail category, however, utilizes
a gross volume test. A retailer satisfies the monetary jurisdictional
requirement if his gross income exceeds $500,000.2
Where monetary standards utilizing an inflow or outflow test
are applicable, it is apparent that the Board has legal jurisdiction
over any employer who meets such standards.- This is due to
25. The standards presently in effect are: (1) non-retail concerns-850,000
outflow or inflow, direct or indirect; (2) office buildings-gross revenue of
$100,000 of which $25,000 or more is derived from organizations which meet
any of the standards; (3) retail conerns-$500,000 gross volume of business;
(4) instrumentalities, links, and channels of interstate commerce-50,000
from interstate (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from services performed
for employers in commerce; (5) public utilities-$250,000 gross volume, or
meet non-retail standards; (6) transit systems-$250,000 gross volume (ex-
cept taxicabs, as to which the retail test applies); (7) newspapers and com-
munication zystems-$200,000 gross volume (newspapers), $100,000 gross
volume (radio, television, telegraph, and telephone); (8) national defense-
substantial impact on national defense; (9) business in the territories or
District of Columbia-xegular standards apply (territories), plenary (District
of Columbia); (10) hotel industry-$500,000 gross volume; (11) associations
-regarded as single employer. A.B.A. SEcT Ix OF LABOR RATIONS LAw,
Comm. ON DE ELoPmENT or THE Lw U~NDR THE NA~ioxAr LABoR RELA:-
TioNs AcT 7 (1959).
26. Inflow and outflow may be regarded as direct or indirect. Direct out-
flow refers to goods or services furnished by employers outside the state to
an employer within the state (who consequently has a direct inflow). Indirect
outflow refers to sales of goods or services to users meeting any of the Board's
jurisdictional standards except the indirect inflow or indirect outflow standard.
Indirect inflow refers to the purchase of goods or services which originated out-
side the employer's state but which he purchased from a seller within the
state who received such goods or services from outside the state. The Board
will add direct and indirect outflow or direct and indirect inflow, but it will
not add outflow and inflow. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB. 81, 85
(1958).
27. See note 25 =pra.
28. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88 (1958). It appears
that the reason the Board does not utilize the inflow and outflow test in all
categories is that it would be too difficult to apply in some cases. Ibid.
29. NLRB v. Benton & Co., 313 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1963) (indirect inflow);
NLRB v. Benevento, 316 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1963) (indirect outflow); Better
Elect. Co.,J.29 NL.R.B. 1012 (1960) (indirect inflow); Borg-Warner Con-
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the fact that the only difference between the inflow and outflow
test and the test of legal jurisdiction espoused by the instant case
is that the former specifies a minimum amount. In M. Benevento
Sand & Gravel Co.,3° for example, a local non-retail business sold
products valued in excess of $100,000 to a company engaged in
interstate commerce. Relying on the instant case, the First Cir-
cuit properly found that these sales satisfied both the monetary
standards for non-retail concerns (inflow or outflow in excess
of $50,000) and the legal jurisdictional requirement ("affecting
commerce") 31
Where monetary standards that utilize a gross volume test
are applicable, however, the Board does not have legal jurisdic-
tion merely because such standards are satisfied; obviously, the
employer's income may exceed the amount set by the Board even
though the employer has no business dealings with enterprises
engaged in interstate commerce. In the instant case, for example,
respondent's gross income exceeded the retail standard of
$500,000.32 If the products sold to New York homeowners had
been purchased from a supplier not engaged in interstate com-
merce, respondent's operations would not have met the legal
jurisdictional requirement although they would still have met the
Board's monetary standard."" In such a case legal jurisdiction may
trols, 128 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1960) (direct outflow); Maybee Stone Co., 129
N.L.R.B. 487 (1960) (indirect outflow); International Longshoremen Union,
124 N.L.R.B. 813 (1959) (direct inflow).
s0. 131 N.L.R.B. 358 (1961), remanded, 297 F2d 878 (1st Cir. 1963),
modified, 188 N.L.R.B. 110 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1963).
31. Originally, the First Circuit had held that the sales did not give the
Board legal jurisdiction. NLRB v. Benevento, 297 F.2d 873 (1st Cir. 1961).
Upon remand the Board protested this action, but made findings showing
that the employer's unfair labor activities actually affected interstate com-
merce. M. Benevento Sand & Gravel Co., 138 NJL.R.B. 110 (1962). The Board
again petitioned for enforcement and in NLRB v. Benevento, 310 F.2d 224
(1st Cir. 1963), the court stated:
It seems to us clear that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction is well
founded, particularly in view of the Per Curiam reversal by the Su-
preme Court of the United States . . . [N.LR.B. v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp., 297 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961)] upon which we relied in part in our
earlier opinion.
32. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1170 (1961).
33. See Stephens, The No Man's Land of Labor Relations Remains Un-
occupied, 14 LA. LJ. 192, 200 (1963).
Respondent believed that the Board asserted its legal jurisdiction by vir-
tue of the fact that respondent's income exceeded $500,000. Brief for Re-
spondent, pp. 3, 12-13. If this were the case, the source of goods would have
no effect on the question of jurisdiction. But the Trial Examiner's report,
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be established by an inflow or outflow of goods or services,3 ' an
actual impact on interstate commerce, 5 contractual relation-
ships,3 or by other means. But since it is very unlikely that an
employer having a gross income exceeding the large amounts set
by the Board would not have an inflow or outflow of goods and
services sufficient to satisfy the "purchase or sale" test, the Board
probably has jurisdiction over all employers meeting the gross
volume standard.
In light of the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdictional
standards, the "purchase or sale" test espoused by the instant
case should simplify jurisdictional issues in labor disputes. By
doing so, the test will reduce the amount of time, energy, and
funds required to resolve jurisdictional issues s7 and the uncer-
tainty as to whether federal or state laws are applicable to
particular labor disputes s
adopted by the Board, made it clear that the Board relied solely on the pur-
chases. "It is enough to find ... that the Respondent ... purchased a substan-
tial amount of fuel oil from... [a company engaged in interstate commerce].
Therefore, interstate commerce was affected by the Respondent's operations."
Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 129 N.L.RB. 1166, 1171 (1961). This type of error
has been made before. See 35 WAsH. L. REv. 196, 203-04 (1960).
34. See, e.g., Legget's Dep't Store, Inc., 184 N.LRB. 1171 (1901); Atlas
Shower Door Co., 131 N.ILB. 96 (1961); Jat Transp. Corp., 128 N.L.R.B.
780 (1960).
35. NLRB v. Hearst, 102 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1939); NLRB v. Bell Oil &
Gas Co., 91 F.d 509 (5th Cir. 1937); Hygienic Sanitation Co., 118 NILRB.
1030 (1957).
36. See Howell Chevrolet v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953); Cottage Bakers,
120 N.LI.R.B. 841 (1958), enforced, 268 Fad 938 (10th Cir. 1959); Ripon
Foods, Inc., 118 N.L.,.B. 536 (1957).
37. The Board will assert jurisdiction over employers who refuse to fur-
nish data relevant to the Board's jurisdictional determinations upon the rea-
sonable request of the Board's agents, where the record developed at a
hearing, duly noticed, scheduled, and held, demonstrates the Board's statutory
jurisdiction irrespective of whether the Board's standards are satisfied. Tropi-
cana Prods., Inc., 122 N.LR.B. 121 (1958); 23 NLRB ArNN. REP. 9-10
(1958). In such a case the test will aid the Board in establishing statutory jur-
isdiction at a hearing.
38. The test eliminates uncertainty as to whether the Board has statutory
jurisdiction since the activities of almost any company will satisfy it. Federal
and state jurisdiction is not concurrent; in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346
U.S. 485 (1953), and Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957),
the Supreme Court held that the states could not take any action with re-
-spect to labor disputes over which the Board had jurisdiction, even though
the Board had declined to act. This created a "no man's land"; inhabited by
employers, employees, and unions with no forum able or willing to provide
a remedy. Cohen, Congress Clears the Labor No Mat's Land: A Long-Awaited
Solution Spawns a Host of New Problems, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 333 (1901);
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Federal Income Tax: Depreciation Deduction
Reducing Basis Below Sales Price Allowed
Taxpayer, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale
of outboard motors, sold its operating assets during the third
quarter of its fiscal year to a purchaser who continued to carry
on the same business. That portion of the sale price allocated
to depreciable assets by the taxpayer exceeded the basis of those
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. In computing its federal
income tax for the year of the sale, the taxpayer claimed a deduc-
tion for depreciation on the assets sold. The deduction was dis-
allowed on the ground that a taxpayer cannot deduct as
depreciation an amount that reduces the basis of its property
below sale price. In a suit to recover the additional taxes paid,
the district court held that a depreciation deduction cannot be
disallowed in the year of sale of depreciable property merely
because the selling price exceeds the basis of the property at the
Rothman, Federal-State Relationships as Affected by the Landrum-Griffin Pro-
visions, 40 U. DaT. L.J. 228 (1962); Shute, State Versus Federal Jurisdiotion
in Labor Disputes: The Garner Case, 19 Mo. L. REv. 119 (1954); 73 H y.
L. REv. 1086 (1960); 43 VA. L. Rav. 733 (1957). In order to eliminate the
"no man's land," Congress added section 14(c) to the Wagner Act. 73 Stat.
541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. 1962); see McCoid, State Regulatiom of
Labor Management Relations: The Impact of Garmon. and Landrum-Grifin, 48
IowA L. Rav. 578, 581 (1963). The statute gave the Board discretionary
power to decline to assert jurisdiction by published rules or by rule of deci-
sion over labor disputes involving any class of employers that, in the Board's
opinion, did not have enough of an effect on commerce to warrant the exercise
of jurisdiction, provided that the Board could not decline to assert jurisdic-
tion over any labor dispute over which it would have asserted jurisdiction
under the standards prevailing on August 1, 1959. It also removed the bar
to assertion of jurisdiction by state agencies or courts over labor disputes the
Board declined.
In order to reduce the cost of determining which forum has jurisdiction,
the Board adopted procedural rules permitting a party or tribunal to seek
an advisory opinion as to whether the Board would decline jurisdiction over
a labor dispute pending in state tribunals. 25 NLRB ANN. REP. 19 (1960); of.
Note, 70 YALE L... 441 (1961). 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.98-104 (1963) sets out the
procedures to be followed in petitioning the Board for an advisory opinion.
Related to the advisory opinion procedure is the procedure by which the gen-
eral counsel may obtain a declaratory order when there is doubt whether
the Board would assert jurisdiction. Where both an unfair labor and a repre-
sentation case relating to the same employer are contemporaneously on file
in a regional office of the Board, the General Counsel may obtain a declara-
tory order disposing of the jurisdictional issue. 29 C.F.R. § 102.105 (1963);
see Comment, 28 FoRnHnW L. RaV. 737, 752 n.65 (1960).
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beginning of the period. S & A Co. ,v. United States, 218 F. Supp.
677 (D. Minn. 1963).1
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permits a
taxpayer to deduct a reasonable annual allowance for deprecia-
tion in computing taxable income? Depreciation is allowed on
the theory that the value of productive capital decreases through
use, as a result of the effects of wear and obsolescence.? This
decrease in value is considered a cost of producing income, similar
to wages and raw materials; the total cost of using any asset is
the purchase price of that asset less its resale price. Since depre-
ciation deductions are taken annually during the period an asset
is actually used by the taxpayer and since taxpayers seldom
know the amount that will be recovered upon disposal of an
asset, total depreciation is, of necessity, an estimate. This total
amount must be spread over the years the asset is actually held,
in accordance with a consistent plan.4 Since taxpayers can only
estimate the length of time an asset will actually be held, annual
depreciation is, in fact, a double estimate -an estimated pro-
portion of an estimated total.
Prior to 1956 the proper criteria for estimating useful life
and salvage value was not settled. Some taxpayers used their
1. Accord, Kimball Gas Prods. Co. v. United States, CCH 1963 STkrW.
FED. T~x REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9507 (WD. Tex. 1962).
2.
General rule. -
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allow-
ance for exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence) -
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
IWT. R rv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a).
3. See United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 301 (1927). In recent years
the depreciation allowance has played an increasingly significant role in the
financing of capital expansion and plant modernization. This added impor-
tance has led to the use of depreciation as a means of implementing national
economic policy. See Keith, Importance of the Depreciation Deduction to
the Economy, 40 TAxs 163 (1962); Yellon, Depredation Developments in
Congress and the Courts, 38 TAXES 952 (1960).
4. The following methods are specifically allowed by LNT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 167(b): 1) straight line method, which consists of equal annual
deductions; 2) declining balance method, which consists of deducting a uni-
form percentage of the remaining undepreciated balance; 3) sum of the
years-digits method, which consists of deducting a decreasing percentage of
the initial undepreciated balance. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(g) (1956). In the
instant case the taxpayer used the straight line method of computing
depreciation.
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intended holding period for an asset as useful life and their antici-
pated resale price for salvage value, while other taxpayers used
the period of economic life inherent in the asset and its scrap
value.5 These estimates, and the depreciation computed thereon,
provided a source of frequent controversy between taxpayers and
the Commissioner." In 1956 the Treasury Department promul-
gated Regulations pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. These Regulations, the first to define useful life and salvage
value, phrased the definitions in terms of the expectation of the
individual taxpayer.1 In Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States,5
the Supreme Court indirectly gave support to the propriety of
the Regulations by declaring that the proper measure of useful
life for taxable years governed by the 1939 Code was the esti-
mated period that the asset would be held in the business,' and
salvage value was the estimated price that would be received for
the asset upon its retirement. 10 Prior to Massey, in Cohn v. United
5. Compare Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 n.7
(1960), with Hertz Corp. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 201, 265 (D. Del.
1958), rev'd, 268 F.2d 604 (8d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 122 (1900).
6. See, e.g., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1027
(1956); L. A. Davidson, 12 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1080 (1953); Bolta Co., 4
CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1945).
7.
(b) Useful Life .... the estimated useful life of an asset is not
necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over
which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the tax-
payer in his trade or business or in the production of his income ...
(c) Salvage. Salvage value is the amount (determined at the time of
acquisition) which is estimated will be realized upon sale or other
disposition of an asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's
trade or business or in the production of his income and is to be
retired from service by the taxpayer .... The time at which an asset
is retired from service may vary according to the policy of the tax-
payer. If the taxpayer's policy is to dispose of assets which are still
in good operating condition, the salvage value may represent a rela-
tively large proportion of the original basis of the asset. However, if
the taxpayer customarily uses an asset until its inherent useful life has
been substantially exhausted, salvage value may represent no more than
junk value. ....
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-1-(b), (c) (1956); see Graves, Depreciation Problems,
102 J. AcCOUNTANCY 43 (1956).
8. 364 U.S. 92 (1960), affirming 264 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1959), 73 HAUv.
L. REv. 593 (1960), reversing sub nom. Evans v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1959).
9. See text accompanying note 20 infra.
10. The taxpayers in Massey were engaged in the automobile rental
business. The cars that they purchased were depreciated on the basis of
a useful life of four years, with no residual salvage value. In fact, the cars
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States,;- another case involving taxable years governed by the
1939 Code, the Sixth Circuit held that where a taxpayer fails to
estimate any salvage value and disposes of assets at the end of
their properly estimated useful life,'- the court may set the actual
sale price of the assets as their reasonable salvage value.13
Unlike the instant case, both Massey and Cohn involved the
sale of individual assets at the end of the period the taxpayer
expected to use those assets in his business. The Commissioner
contended, however, that these differences were legally irrele-
vant:I4 He argued that the rationale of Massey, illustrated in
were used six to 18 months and sold for a sum that nearly equaled their
cost. This was done because of the demand in the industry for modern
equipment.
The dispute between the taxpayer and the Commissioner centered on
the construction of the Treasury Regulations defining the reasonable allow-
ance for depreciation as the annual amount that, plus salvage value, will
total cost "at the end of the useful life of the property in the business." The
taxpayer contended that "in the business" referred to "property" and de-
fined the class of assets on which depreciation was allowable. The Court,
however, sustained the Commissioner's contention that "in the business" re-
ferred to "useful life" and defined the period of time over which depreciation
could be computed.
In order to fully appreciate this case, it must be considered in the context
of the previous controversy between the Commissioner and taxpayers en-
gaged in the car rental business. That controversy was whether the cars
were business assets held for use in the business and subject to a depredation
allowance, or nondepreciable inventory. See Philber Equip. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 37 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956), 35 TtxAs L. Rnv. 610 (1957).
11. 259 Fad 371 (6th Cir. 1958), 37 TEAs L. REv. 787 (1959).
12. The assets involved in this case were used in the operation of three
flight schools during World War 11. It was estimated that the flight training
contracts would terminate at the end of 1944 and that date was used as
the end of the useful life of the assets for purposes of computing deprecia-
tion. The assets of one of the schools were sold in August, 1944, and the
assets of the other two schools were sold in October and November, 1944.
Upon sale, an amount considerably in excess of the undepreciated basis was
realized. The district court disallowed the claimed depreciation on all three
groups of assets in the year of sale, because the actual salvage value was
known at the end of those tax years to be considerably in excess of the
book value of those assets at the beginning of the year. Depreciation claimed
on one group of assets for the year preceding sale was also denied because it
was reasonably estimable, by reason of the prices for which similar equip-
ment had been sold during that year, what the salvage value of those assets
would be and this exceeded the book value of those assets at the beginning
of the year preceding sale.
13. But see 37 TxAs L. 1REv. 787 n.1 (1959).
14. A distinction between the sale of depreciable assets prior to the end
of their useful life and a sale of assets at the end of their useful life was
first made by the Tax Court in Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990
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Cohn, admits that both useful life and salvage value are estimated
initially but that when the assets are disposed of the actual
holding period and amount realized upon sale are to be used, not
the original estimates. Since the Treasury Regulations' limit the
amount of total depreciation to cost less salvage value, deprecia-
tion that reduces the basis of property below the known sale
price should be disallowed in the year of sale.'0
The Commissioner's position was rejected by the instant court
as an unwarranted extension of the existing law. The court de-
cided that the useful life of an asset is the period it can reasonably
be expected to be used in the taxpayer's business - the useful
life does not terminate when a business is sold as a going concern.
Thus, the court concluded that the sale price reflected the
market value of the assets at a point in time prior to when
salvage value is to be judged, not salvage value. Under these
circumstances the fact that the sale price exceeded the basis of
the assets did not mean that total depreciation exceeded cost
less salvage value.
The court's rejection of the Commissioner's position is sup-
(1947), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949); but it was sub-
sequently obscured by that court in Randolph D. Rouse, 39 T.C. 70 (1902),
and Contra Costa Trucking Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1018 (1963). Both
of these latter cases followed Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 29. The
federal district courts, however, have not fully accepted the position of the
Commissioner stated in Rev. Rul. 6-92, supra. See Motorlease Corp. v.
United States, 215 F. Supp. 356 (D. Conn. 1963); Kimball Gas Prods. Co. v.
United States, CCH 1963 STAND. Fx). TAx REP. (63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9507
(W.D. Tex. 1962); Fink, Motorlease Case Allows Depreciation in Year of
Sale, Rejects Rev. Rvi. 62-92, 18 J. TAXATIo N 830 (1963). The Supreme
Court alluded to this distinction in Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S.
122 (1960); see note 25 infra.
15. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-1-(a) (1956) defines the reasonable allowance
for depreciation as the amount "set aside for the taxable year . . . so that
the aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus salvage value, will, at the end
of the estimated useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost or
other basis of the property. . . ." Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-1-(c) provides that
"in no event shall an asset (or an account) be depreciated below a reasonable
salvage value."
16. This is the same position stated in Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 Cum.
BuLL. 29, 31:
Therefore, the deduction for depreciation of an asset used in the trade
or business or in the production of income shall be adjusted in the
year of disposition so that the deduction, otherwise properly allowable
for such year under the taxpayer's method of accounting for deprecia-
tion, is limited to the amount, if any, by which the adjusted basis of
the property at the beginning of such year exceeds the amount realized
from sale or exchange....
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ported by both authority and reason. Neither Massey nor Cohn
controlled the question presented. The taxpayer in Massey had
intentionally over-depreciated assets that he disposed of at regu-
lar intervals, in an effort to take an undue tax advantage;"7 the
decision of the Court in Massey was directed toward preventing
such a misuse of the tax law. No such danger existed in the instant
case. The sale of an entire business is a single nonrecurring event
that is not likely to be induced by a relatively small tax advan-
tage. Cohn involved a taxpayer who failed to consider any
salvage value in the computation of depreciation, even though
it was anticipated that the assets would be disposed of near the
end of'a war, when they would demand a substantial price due
to the scarcity of goods.'8 In the instant case the taxpayer's esti-
mate of salvage value was reasonable, based on facts known by
him when the estimate was made.'9I Since prior cases did not address themselves to the question,
the court in the instant case was required to determine initially
whether the proper measure of useful life is the period assets are
useful to the taxpayer, or the period assets are useful to the
businessP0 The Commissioner seized upon language in Massey
to support the proposition that useful life was the period that
the assets were useful to the taxpayer.2 ' The court rejected this
argument on the ground that the language relied on by the
Commissioner was addressed to the distinction between useful-
ness in a particular business and economic usefulness. Even if
the language used by the Court in Massey were deemed per-
suasive, it is quite evident from that case and from the statuteF
17. Massey Motors v. United States, 364 U.S. 92,97 (1900).
18. Cohm v. United States, 259 F.2d 371, 375 (1959).
19. Instant case at 681, 682.
20. In effect the question is whether the emphasis in the phrase "useful
in the taxpayer's business" is placed on "the taxpayer" or on "the business."
21. "This requires that the useful life of the asset be related to the
period for which it may reasonably be expected to be employed in the
taxpayer's business." 364 U.S. at 107, cited in Brief for Defendant, p. 9,
instant case.
22.
In the original Act, Congress did provide that a reasonable allowance
would be permitted for "wear and tear of property arisin out of its
we or employment in the business'. . .. This language, particularly
that emphasized above, may be fairly construed to mean that the
wear and tear to the property must arise from its use in the business
of the taxpayer ....
364 U.S. at 97. (Emphasis added by Court.)
The alternative is to estimate the period the asset will be held in the
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that usefulness to the business is the proper measurement of use-
ful life.24
Where a taxpayer properly estimates the useful life of his
business assets but sells those assets prior to the time he intended
to dispose of them and where the assets are sold as part of a
going concern to a purchaser who continues to carry on the
business of the taxpayer, the sale price is a reflection of the
assets' remaining usefulness in that business. If they had no
remaining usefulness the purchaser would not buy them for that
purpose. Such a sale does not change the useful life of the assets;
rather it lends support to the original estimate. Where assets
are sold prior to the end of their useful lives the sale price is the
market value of the remaining usefulness plus salvage value, not
salvage value alone2 5
The denial of a depredation allowance in the year a depreci-
able asset is sold, merely because the sale price equals or exceeds
business and the price that will be received for it on retirement.
S64 U.S. at 105.
The approach taken by the Commissioner computes depreciation ex-
pense in a manner which is far more likely to reflect correctly the
actual cost over the years in which the asset is employed in the
business.
S64 U.S. at 106.
28. Quoted note 2 mupra.
24. If the conclusion were otherwise, the retirement and life expectancy
of the taxpayer would be relevant in the computation of depreciation. For
example, if two proprietors purchased identical business assets at the same
time and both expected to use the assets in their business for a period of
20 years, but one taxpayer was an elderly man who intended to turn his
business over to his son in a few years while the other taxpayer was a young
man who expected to retain ownership of his business, these expectations
would limit the useful life and rate of depreciation of the assets. Such a
result does not appear economically sound; nor does it appear to be within
the design of the statute.
25. Of. Hertz Corp. v. United States, 864 U.S. 122 (1960), 88 CI-I(ENT
L. Ray. 188 (1961), in which the taxpayer depreciated assets using the
declining balance method. The assets were sold at the end of their estimated
useful life for a price that exceeded the residual undepreciated balance at
the end of their useful life. The Commissioner disallowed the portion of the
claimed depreciation that would have reduced the balance below sale price,
on the ground that the claimed depreciation would reduce the balance below
a reasonable salvage value. The Commissioner's position was sustained, be-
cause the assets involved were sold at the end of their estimated useful life.
The Court said, however, "that if an asset is disposed of early in what was
expected to be its useful life in the business, the depreciation taken may
greatly exceed the difference between the purchase price of the asset and
its retirement price... ." Id. at 127.
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the asset's basis, implies that prior depreciation was greater
than actual wear and obsolescence would warrant; but other
causes may account for such a gain.-" An increase in value
that corresponds to capital asset appreciation that is taxed
at the preferential capital gain rate may have been responsible.
If so, it should be taxed at the preferential rate in the absence of
a specific congressional declaration to the contrary.7 It should
not be conclusively assumed that the gain realized upon sale of
a depreciable asset is caused by excessive depreciation without a
showing that the prior depreciation was excessive and without
allowing the taxpayer to show that the gain was the result of
other causes.
Labor Law: Dissenting Employees Entitled to
Refund of Union Shop Dues Used for Political Purposes
Respondents, employees of the Southern Railway Company,
brought an action in the North Carolina courts to restrain peti-
tioner unions from collecting dues from them under a union
shop agreement authorized by section 2 (Eleventh) of the Railway
labor Act.' Respondents alleged, and a jury found, that a por-
tion of the dues collected was to be used for political contribu-
26. Examples of other factors which would cause an increase in the
value of a depreciable asset are: (1) A general increase in the price level;
(2) A fluctuation in the market demand for the asset; (3) An adaptation of
the asset to more productive alternative uses.
27. During the taxable years involved in the instant case, the gain or
loss on the sale of depreciable assets was subject to the provisions of INT.
RLV. CODE Op 1954, § 1231. The treatment of a gain from such a sale has
subsequently been changed by the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962,
76 Stat. 960, ITT. REV. CODE op 1954, § 1245. With certain exceptions this
provision taxes as ordinary income that portion of the proceeds from the
sale of depreciable assets that exceeds the present basis but is less than the
original basis of the asset. This change was part of a major change in the
treatment of depreciation. It does not demonstrate a diminution of the
interest in capital mobility and plan modernization, but a change in the
method of accomplishing those ends.
While the problem involved in the instant case will not arise with re-
spect to transactions to which § 1245 is applicable, the position of taxpayer
and Commissioner remain in opposition in the disposal of depreciable assets
not subject to § 1245.
For an analysis of recent developments in the treatment of depreciable
assets, see Goldstein, Developments in Tax Deprecation and Related Areas,
49 VA. L. REv. 411 (1963); Shapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section
1245 of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YA E LJ. 1483 (1963).
1. 64 Stat. 12S8 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh) (1958).
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tions and for a death benefits system, matters unrelated to col-
lective bargaining. The trial court temporarily enjoined peti-
tioners from collecting dues from respondents; the injunction was
subject to modification, however, to the extent of that proportion
of dues that the unions showed was required for collective
bargaining. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed,- but
on rehearing divided evenly and affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion.3 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr.
Justice Black concurring 4 and Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting,
reversed and held that although the allegation sufficiently stated
a cause of action,' the injunctive remedy was improper for it in-
terfered with activities in which the union had a right to engage.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.8. Clerks v. Allen, 873 U.S. 113 (1963).
Section 2 (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act permits a
carrier and a labor union to agree to a union shop in which all
employees are required to pay dues, fees, and assessments to
the union.0 In enacting this statute Congress felt that it would
be inequitable to provide for collective bargaining by employees
and then to allow nonunion employees to reap the benefits of
2. Allen v. Southern Ry., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).
3. Allen v. Southern Ry., 256 N.C. 700, 124 S.E.2d 871 (1962) (per
curiam).
4. Mr. Justice Black dissented from the opinion of the Court in the
earlier ease of International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 780
(1961). Apparently, he concurred here solely on the ground that the instant
decision was consistent with the holding in Street. Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 873 U.S. 113, 124 (1963).
5. Respondents did not enumerate specific political expenditures to
which they objected. In upholding the complaint over Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissent, the Court apparently overruled Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820
(1961), in which specific objections were required. The result of the instant
case better guarantees the dissenting member's first amendment right to be
exempt from political contributions; the first amendment freedom of expres-
sion includes the freedom to refrain from support of all causes as well as
the freedom to disapprove of specific causes. See text accompanying note 10
infra.
The Court also decided that it is sufficient to first make the objection in
the complaint. Instant case at 119 n.6. The propriety of such a procedure is
questionable. In order to reduce litigation some notice prior to the complaint
would be more desirable, as the instant Court itself implied when it suggested
that unions should strive for internal solution of such problems. Instant case
at 123. Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
which did not apply to the prior trial of the instant case, a union member
may be required to exhaust internal union remedies before resorting to
court action. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
6. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh) (1958).
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bargaining without contributing to its expense.7 Literally read,
the statute places no restriction on the use of dues collected under
a collective bargaining agreement; the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Street," however, construed sec-
tion 2 (Eleventh) to deny unions the power to spend a dissenting
employee's money for political purposes0 The Court apparently
felt that the exaction of dues for political purposes violates an
individual's first amendment right of free expression, and by this
construction it avoided invalidating the statute on constitutional
grounds.'0
The Street case, however, failed to establish criteria to be
followed in fashioning a remedy for dissenting employees. In the
instant case, the Court rejected the temporary injunction issued
by the North Carolina court" on the ground that prior to final
7. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 US. 740, 761-02
(1961); Welrngton, Maclinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the
Avoidance of Contitutional Issues, in 1901 Surumm CouRT Rnvmw 49
(Kurland ed. 1961); 28 BaoosLzx L. REv. 170 (1961); 61 CoLumL L. Ray.
1513 (1961).
8.-367 U.S. 740 (1961).
9. The Court, "however, noted that "dissent is not to be presumed" and
required that the dissenting employee affirmatively make his objection known
to the union. 367 US. at 774. See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956).
10. The statute had previously been upheld as a legitimate exercise of
congressional power in maintaining industrial peace in interstate transporta-
tion, Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 851 U.S. 225 (1956); it therefore
pre-empted North Carolina "right-to-work" statutes forbidding a union shop,
N.C. GEN. STAT., 95-78 to -84 (1958), which would otherwise have been
applicable. See Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d
441 (1955).
Commentators on the decision in Street have felt that the Court should
have met the constitutional question squarely. See Wellington, supra note, 49;
1961 U. ILL. L.F. 526. The Court has also avoided the thorny problem of
whether the infringement on the member's freedom of speech is governmental
action, or merely private action not protected by the Constitution. Aside
-from Mr. Justice Douglas' view, expressed in a separate opinion in Street,
367 U.S. at 777 n.3, that the infringement would be state action, the Court
has not ruled on whether it is state action through judicial enforcement. See
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1
(1948); Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action
Concept, 44 CAT". L. REv. 718 (1956). See also Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery,
349 U.S. 70 (1955). It would appear, however, that the union could be
considered an "instrumentality" of the government- an organization to
which the government has given coercive authority under the Railway
Labor Act. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 305 US. 715 (1901);
Comment, 44 CALIn. L. RE.v. 718 (1956).
11. Allen v. Southern Ry., 249 N.C. 491, 493, 107 S.E.2d 125, 126 (1959).
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judgment in favor of the dissenting employees the union must
be free to collect dues from all. Since dissenting employees may
recover improperly paid assessments at the conclusion of the
suit, this distinction affects only the time of payment of dues
and not the amount paid. Nevertheless, it allows the union to
proceed normally with its functions until final judgment, which
seems more consistent with the court's holding that the dissenting
employee is not entitled to be relieved of the payment of all dues.
Instead, the Court provided that the union refund to dissent-
ing employees a portion of their dues already paid corresponding
to the proportion that union political expenditures bear to total
union expenditures; the Court also provided that the union
reduce the dissenters' future dues in the same proportion."' Since
the unions have possession of all pertinent records, the Court
in the instant case required that the burden of proving the
proportion of expenditures used for political purposes be on the
unions. At the trial below, the unions did not introduce evidence
to show the amount of union expenditures for political pur-
poses;' 3 the Court failed to expressly indicate, however, the
procedure to be followed if, on remand, the union should fail
to bear its burden of proof. The inference to be drawn from the
opinion is that the Court would not permit an injunction re-
straining a union from collecting any dues. If a union default,
the union's accounting records could be subpoenaed and a court
could independently determine the probable maximum propor-
tion of total expenditures used for political purposes.
In formulating a remedy, the Court apparently rejected an
injunction restraining the union from spending money for polit-
ical purposes.14 Although such an injunction has much to com-
mend it - it would be relatively easy to administer, it would
not need periodic modification, and it would protect the rights
of dissenting members - it might violate a right of the majority
members to use the union as a vehicle to express their political
Although such an order is generally not appealable, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958),
the Court dealt with the temporary injunction. See instant case at 120.
12. Instant case at 122. It would appear that the refund is to encompass
the period beginning when the employee voices his objection and ending
with the time of final judgment.
13. The record indicated, however, that the trial court probably had
allowed the unions an opportunity to satisfy their burden of proof.
14. Another possible remedy, an injunction restraining unions from com-
pelling employees to pay any money, was held improper in Street. 367 U.S.
at 771.
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views. Whether such a right exists seems open to question.'5
Voluntary associations do have such a right, but, under a union
shop agreement, union membership is not necessarily voluntary
since dissenting-members cannot withdraw and keep their jobs.
By electing the benefits of compulsory membership, arguably
unions should assume the burden of protecting minority inter-
ests. Yet perhaps the instant case, by relieving dissenting mem-
bers from compulsory contribution to political causes, adequately
protects these rightsY
15. The Supreme Court apparently recognizes such a right.
IT]he fact that these expenditures are made for political activities is
an. additional reason for reluctance to impose such an injunctive
remedy. ... As to such expenditures [those made to disseminate infor-
mation on candidates and to publicize the unions' position on them]
an injunction would work a restraint on the expression of political ideas
which might be offensive to the First Amendment. For the majority
also has an interest in stating its views without being silenced by the
dissenters. To attain the appropriate reconciliation between majority
and dissenting interests in the area of political expression, we think the
courts in administering the Act should select remedies which protect
both interests to the maximum extent possible without undue impinge-
ment of one on the other.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961). See
also instant case at 122. In contrast, Congress has circumscribed the right
of unions to engage in political activities by § 610 of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1959). That statute provides in part:
It is unlawful for any ... labor organization to make a contribution
or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential
and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for,
or in connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices. ....
The constitutionality of this statute has been questioned. See Clover, Political
C ntributi n by Labor Unions, 40 TExAs L. R-v. 665 (1962); Ruark, Labor'as
Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. Xxv. 61 (1958); Note, An
Attekpt To Restrict Union and Corporate Political Activity, 46 AWLQ. L.
Rxv. 364 (1963). In several decisions involving activities prosecuted
under this provision the courts have avoided the constitutional question by
determining that the litigated activity fell outside the proscribed area of
political action. In this manner the statute has been effectively emasculated.
See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 385 U.S. 106 (1948) (statute does not forbid
publication of union periodical for members expressing views on candidates);
United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 Fad 854 (2d Cir. 1949) (statute
does not apply to purchases of radio and newspaper advertising in connec-
tion with Republican Convention by union not owning a newspaper). A
recent exception in which the Court nonetheless did not discuss the consti-
tutionality of the statute is United States v. UAW, 852 US. 567 (1957) (use
of union dues to sponsor television broadcast designed to influence election
would violate statute).
16. Admittedly, in striking a balance between the rights of the majority
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Although the issue appears to have been squarely presented
in the instant case, the Court failed to establish a guide for
determining those expenditures for which the union has the
right to compel the payment of dues and those to which ob-
jectors may properly dissent. 7 The injunction granted by the
North Carolina court included contributions to a death benefits
system.' By rejecting that injunction as a remedy that "sweeps
too broadly,"'" the Court may have limited the right to dissent
to those expenditures that are political in nature. Many nonpo-
litical expenditures, such as payment to a death benefits system,
arguably do not affect the individual's freedom of expression
sufficiently to override the rights of the majority of the union.
The Street decision, which emphasized that Congress designed
section 2 (Eleventh) to require all employees who benefit from
collective bargaining to share its cost,20 may be read, however,
to allow dissenters to obtain a refund of dues in proportion to
expenditures not germane to collective bargaining. Under this
view, a dissenter's constitutional right may be violated even
with regard to contributions to a death benefits system.
In either case the Court has left unclear what types of ex-
penditures fall into the class from which members may dissent.
If any expenditures not germane to collective bargaining are
the proper subject of dissent, the Court would have avoided a
substantial amount of future appellate review by an express
statement to that effect. Similarly, if only political expenditures
are subject to dissent the instant case has left unclear what
constitutes a recoverable political expenditure.2 ' If the Court
and those of the dissenters, the dissenting member does not receive one ele-
ment of protection available under an injunction against all political ex-
penditures: Insofar as dissenting members object not only to the contribu-
tions to political causes but also to having the union that purports to represent
them supporting political positions adverse to their own, a refund of dues does
not afford complete relief.
17. Instead, the Court expressly refused to treat this subject. Instant case
at 121.
18. Instant case at 117; Brief for Petitioners, pp. 3-4.
19. Instant case at 120.
20. See 367 U.S. at 761-62. Much of the language in Street suggests that re-
covery of political expenditures was allowed in that decision primarily because
they fell outside the area of expenditures germane to collective bargaining.
See 367 U.S. at 768, 777, 778, 790. The instant case also occasionally used
such language. The instant Court seemed to feel that there is a distinction
between "political expenditures" and "those germane to collective bargaining."
373 U.S. at 121.
21. It might be contended that the Court intended to adopt the test for
"political objects" set out in the British Trade Union Act included in an ap-
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intended to limit dissent to those expenditures that are political
in nature, it could have adopted substantially the following test:
Any expenditure is political that is designed to gain support for
any political candidate, party, or item of legislation. This test
encompasses all expenditures relating directly to the influence
6f the conduct of government- the common definition of the
term "political"22- while not unduly restricting a union's legiti-
mate sphere of activity that is consistent with the union shop.es
pendix to the-opinion. This test is, essentially, the promotion of the candidacy
for or inancial support of a Member of Parliament, or the holding of political
meetings and the distribution of political literature. It does not seem to in-
clude support or opposition to current legislation. 373 US. at 126. However,
the British act was included in the appendix primarily as a suggestion for vol-
untary adoption by the unions. Moreover, the Court said, "we do not mean
to suggest... that the particular boundary drawn by the Act between politi-
cal expenditures and those. germane to collective bargaining is necessarily
sound." 373 U.S. at 128 n.8.
22. WEnsRn's Nuw COr uT DicmoxARY 654 (1956).
28. Such a test would cover direct contributions in support of any political
candidate or party and expenditures for advertisements advocating a candidate
or party. Lobbying for favorable labor legislation, while perhaps in a sense
germane to collective bargaining, is also political in nature and under this
test dissenting members would be exempt from supporting it. Of. International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777-78 (1961) (Douglas, J, dis-
senting). Union newspapers containing political editorials create a problem
under this analysis. Aside from the political portions, the union should be
able to collect funds to maintain a newspaper. However, unless some rational
allocation of those funds between political editorials and the remainder of
the publication could be made, dissenting members should be exempted from
supporting such a newspaper.
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